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CATEGORY FORMATION IN AUTISM: CAN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
ABSTRACT SOCIAL AND NON-SOCIAL VISUAL PROTOTYPES? 
 Holly Zajac Gastgeb, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
 
There is a growing amount of evidence suggesting that individuals with autism have difficulty 
with categorization.  One basic cognitive ability that is necessary for categorization and may 
underlie difficulties with categorization is the ability to abstract and represent categorical 
information with a central representation or prototype.  The current study examined prototype 
formation abilities in individuals with autism with social (faces) and non-social (dot patterns) 
stimuli using behavioral methodologies and eye-tracking in high functioning adults with autism 
and matched controls.  Individuals with autism were found to have difficulty forming prototypes 
of both faces and dot patterns.  Relationships were found between performance on the prototype 
tasks and measures of intelligence, symptoms of autism, and measures of low-level perceptual 
functioning in the individuals with autism.  The eye-tracking data did not reveal any between 
group differences in the general pattern of attention to the faces or dot patterns during the 
familiarization period indicating that the difficulties with prototype formation were not due to 
attentional factors.  The results of the current study are consistent with previous studies that have 
found a deficit in prototype formation and indicate that these deficits exist with both familiar 
social stimuli such as faces and novel non-social stimuli such as dot patterns.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Autism, a pervasive developmental disorder with onset before age three, is characterized 
by qualitative impairments in social interaction and communication and repetitive stereotyped 
patterns of behavior, interests, and activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  As one 
of a set of disorders called autism spectrum disorders, autism shares similar impairments with 
Asperger’s disorder and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), 
but at a greater level of severity.  Recently, autism spectrum disorders have been a popular 
subject of research and have received a significant amount of attention in the popular media due 
to an alarming rise in prevalence world-wide.  According to the most recent reports from the 
Centers for Disease Control, one in every 110 children in the United States develops an autism 
spectrum disorder (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007).  As a result, it is 
imperative that researchers gain a better understanding of the underlying deficits in autism. 
To date, much research on autism has focused on social deficits, because they are both 
necessary and unique to the diagnosis.  However, there is a growing literature suggesting that 
individuals with autism also have significant information processing and cognitive deficits (e.g., 
Frith & Happé, 1994; Mottron & Belleville, 1993; Ozonoff, 1997; Plaisted, O’Riordan, & Baron-
Cohen, 1998), and indeed some believe that these cognitive processing differences should be 
considered as a part of the diagnostic criteria for autism (Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, & 
Burack, 2006).  Several theories have been proposed to explain cognitive deficits in individuals 
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with autism including executive functioning (e.g., Ozonoff, 1997), weak central coherence (e.g., 
Frith & Happé, 1994), and theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  Although 
these theories have a number of strengths that aid in understanding the syndrome of autism, they 
also share a number of weaknesses.  
 First, all three theories consist of broad constructs that are difficult to operationally 
define.  It is difficult to know exactly what is meant by “theory of mind”, “executive 
functioning”, or “central coherence”, because the definitions tend to vary depending on the 
researcher, the research question of interest, and the range of measurements that are used to 
address this question.  Second, the measurement tools and experimental tests that are used to 
study each of these theories are broad, imprecise, and artificial.  Experimental tests of all three 
theories often have components that tap into aspects of language, attention, memory, and other 
cognitive abilities.  Third, tests of weak central coherence and theory of mind require executive 
functioning, tests of theory of mind and executive functioning may be approached with a weak 
central coherence processing style, and tests of executive functioning and weak central 
coherence may require people to have a theory of mind in order to understand what they should 
be doing.  Thus, these abilities may be interrelated and tests have not yet been designed that can 
precisely measure the abilities or deficits proposed by one theory.   
More recently, researchers have started to move away from these broad theories and are 
beginning to study other more specific aspects of cognitive and information processing that may 
be different or deficient in autism.  One aspect of information processing that is receiving more 
attention in research with individuals with autism is categorization.  Categorization is critically 
important, and it is evident that within the first year of life infants begin to form categories (e.g., 
Lewis & Strauss, 1986; Quinn & Oates, 2004).  Categorization reduces demands on memory and 
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allows individuals to focus on important aspects of objects while ignoring irrelevant details.  It 
also allows children to understand what others are saying and to learn language.  There is a 
growing amount of evidence suggesting that individuals with autism have difficulty with some 
aspects of object categorization and engage in different categorization processes than do 
typically developing individuals (e.g., Gastgeb, Strauss, & Minshew, 2006; Klinger & Dawson, 
1995; Plaisted, 2000).  It is also well-known that individuals with autism have deficits in the 
categorization and perception of facial information including categorization of gender (e.g., 
Behrmann et al., 2006; Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2010; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 
2004), facial expression, (e.g., Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Rump, Giovannelli, 
Minshew, & Strauss, 2009), face recognition (e.g., Best, Strauss, Newell, & Minshew, in prep; 
Klin, Sparrow, de Bildt, Cicchetti, Cohen, & Volkmar, 1999; Lahaie, Mottron, Arguin, 
Berthiaume, Jemel, & Saumier, 2006) and the perception of facial distinctiveness (e.g., Best, 
Strauss, Newell, & Minshew, 2005).  The question that remains is whether there is a specific 
process that may underlie the difficulties that individuals with autism have with categorization of 
both objects and faces.  
1.1 PROTYPE FORMATION IN TYPICAL POPULATIONS 
One basic cognitive ability that is necessary for the categorization of objects and faces 
and may underlie the processing differences and deficits with both is the ability to abstract and 
represent categorical information with a central representation or prototype.  A prototype is an 
average representation of past information that depicts the average of the variations within a 
given category that is stored in the brain.  There has been a debate in the literature as to whether 
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objects are stored as exemplars in a multidimensional space (Nosofsky & Kantner, 2006) or 
around an abstracted prototype of a category (Smith, 2002; Smith, Redford, Gent, & Washburn, 
2005).  Although this debate has yet to be resolved, many believe that it is likely that people can 
do either and that which process is used depends on available aspects such as the type and 
amount of information about a category and the amount of experience that one has with a given 
category (Kéri, 2003; Murphy, 2002).  The ability to form a prototype is a critical skill for 
category learning, because it decreases memory load and allows individuals to store an average 
representation of items that they have experienced rather than needing to store every item in 
memory.   
Prototype formation is particularly important for face perception and recognition.  
Valentine (1991) suggests that exemplars and prototypical information about faces are stored in a 
multidimensional space called the “face space” that is formed through experience with faces.  He 
proposed a multi-dimensional framework in which faces are stored in an n-dimensional space 
representing all possible features used to encode a face, including both featural and configural 
information in addition to information used to discriminate faces (e.g., age, gender, and race).  The 
center of this multi-dimensional framework represents the central tendency of all facial information 
(prototype), and the distribution of facial features and facial information is normally distributed 
around this central tendency.  Valentine’s (1991) face-space theory provides an explanation and 
framework for many face perception and recognition effects.  This includes the recognition 
advantage for distinctive faces and caricatures (e.g., Best & Strauss, 2007; Best, Strauss, Newell, 
Gastgeb, and Costello, 2004; Devine & Malpass, 1985; Goldstein & Chance, 1980; Humphreys, 
2003; Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987), the classification advantage of gender-typical faces  in 
gender classification tasks (e.g., O’Toole et al., 1998), and the preference for attractive faces 
over unattractive faces (e.g., Rubenstein, Kalakanis, & Langlois, 1999). 
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The ability to form a prototype of faces and objects is a specific process that is present in 
infants (Quinn, 1987; Ramsey, Langlois, & Marti, 2005; Younger & Gotlieb, 1988) from as early 
as three months of age (Bomba & Siqueland, 1983).  Researchers found that when infants were 
given a choice between a never seen prototype (face comprised of averaged features) and either a 
previously seen face or a novel face, infants looked less at the prototype face (Rubenstein, et al., 
1999; Strauss, 1979).  This indicates that the infants considered both the previously seen face and 
the novel face as more novel than the prototype.  Because the prototype was never seen, the 
infants must have abstracted the prototype by viewing the variations of the faces that were 
presented to them.  Other researchers have found similar evidence for prototype formation of 
object categories (Younger, 1985, 1990) and dot patterns (Bomba & Siqueland, 1983; Younger 
& Gotlieb, 1988) in infants.  Thus, it appears that young infants can form a prototype of a variety 
of information from a very young age.  
Evidence for the formation of prototypes in children and adults comes from studies on the 
prototype effect, the tendency to falsely remember a prototype as previously seen or experienced 
even though it is comprised of a combination of features that were either never seen at all or seen 
infrequently but never in that combination.  A classic study by Posner and Keele (1968) found 
that when adults are trained on dot patterns that vary and are then later tested on a variety of dot 
patterns, they tend to falsely remember the unseen prototype and consider it to be as familiar as 
dot patterns that were previously seen.  This effect has been replicated using a wide range of 
stimuli including dots (Kéri, Kálmán, Kelemen, Benedek, & Janka, 2001; Knowlton & Squire, 
1993; Zaki & Nosofsky, 2004), abstract forms (Homa, Goldhart, Burruel-Homa, & Smith, 1993), 
and faces (Gastgeb, Rump, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009; Reed, 1972) in a wide variety of 
populations including typically developing children (Hayes & Taplin, 1993b), children with mild 
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learning disability (Hayes & Taplin, 1993a), adults with Alzheimer’s disease (Kéri, Kálmán, 
Rapcsak, Antal, Benedek, & Janka, 1999; Kéri, Kálmán, et al., 2001), adults with schizophrenia 
(Kéri, Kelemen, Benedek, & Janka, 2001), and individuals with mild mental retardation (Hayes 
& Conway, 2000).  Researchers have also found a relationship between the similarity of a 
pattern/object to the prototype of a certain category and the likelihood of it being recognized as a 
member of that category (Cabeza, Bruce, Kato, & Oda, 1999; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Solso 
& McCarthy, 1981), with exemplars of high similarity (or small amounts of distortion from the 
prototype in the case of dots) resulting in greater recognition than low similarity (or high 
amounts of distortion from the prototype in the case of dots).  
While the formation of a prototype is a basic cognitive ability that is present in infancy 
and throughout adulthood, it is also a very complex high-level cognitive process.  In order to 
form a prototype of a category, an individual needs to learn what aspects of the objects vary, how 
they vary, and the boundaries of this variation.  They need to be able to abstract the average and 
variability of these aspects and form them into a multidimensional composite (the prototype).  
Prototypes also impact top down processes such as comparisons of new exemplars to the 
prototype which can then influence processes such as the discrimination of subtle differences 
that is necessary for categorization.  These types of processes are most important as people 
develop expertise with a given category and begin to develop more subordinate categories which 
require more subtle discriminations.  
 Research by Tanaka and Taylor (1991) found that as people gain more expertise with a 
category such as dogs, they are able to do finer, more subtle levels of discrimination and with 
enough experience process these subordinate categories in the same way as non-experts process 
basic level categories.  Thus, dog experts’ prototypes have been updated to include all of the 
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subtle features that differentiate within a breed of dog and future exposures to dog exemplars 
will be affected by comparisons to these prototypes.  Therefore, the formation of a prototype can 
affect categorization in a multitude of ways from decreasing demands on memory to influencing 
what subtle differences are even perceived by an individual.  If individuals with autism are 
unable to form a prototype or do so in a different way, this may affect their ability to categorize 
both objects and faces which in turn could lead to the difficulties in socialization and 
communication that are present in autism.  
1.2 CATEGORIZATION IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
Results of studies conducted to determine if there are categorization deficits in 
individuals with autism have been mixed.  Early studies concluded that individuals with autism 
are able to form categories successfully.  These studies, however, used categories that had simple 
definitive features such as color or size and did not examine whether individuals with autism 
process category information in the same manner as typically developing individuals, especially 
when the categories are more complex (Tager-Flusberg, 1985; Ungerer & Sigman, 1987).  It is 
possible that, while individuals with autism can successfully categorize on the basis of simple 
definitive features, they may have difficulty categorizing when categorization is based on more 
complex or less perceptually apparent features (Klinger & Dawson, 1995; Plaisted, 2000).  
Another possible explanation for the mixed findings is that most studies of categorization have 
failed to control for typicality of the stimuli.  It is possible that while individuals with autism 
may be able to categorize typical exemplars, less typical exemplars may pose more difficulty.  
As category exemplars become less typical, criterial features also become less apparent and 
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decision processes become more difficult.  Thus, studies using only typical exemplars of a 
category may not indicate deficits in these individuals.  Studies using atypical exemplars, 
however, may show categorization deficits as the task becomes more difficult. 
Several studies support the notion that individuals with autism can and do form 
categories, but they do so in a way that is different from typically developing individuals.  A few 
studies have provided evidence that individuals with autism do not group words into categories 
in order to aid in memorization (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970; Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz, & 
Payton, 1992).  Hermelin and O’Connor (1970) compared children with autism to those showing 
typical development and delayed development and found that children with autism did not 
memorize words by grouping them into conceptual categories relative to children with typical or 
delayed development.  Minshew et al. (1992) found that individuals with autism, unlike typically 
developing individuals, did not use categorical information as a strategy to improve memory on 
the California Verbal Learning Test.  In both of these studies, the individuals with autism were 
able to remember as many items as controls, suggesting that they did not have an impairment in 
rote-memory but were not using organizing strategies of categorization to improve their 
memories.   
Minshew, Meyer, and Goldstein (2002) conducted a study that examined the performance 
of high-functioning individuals with autism, compared to controls, on concept identification 
versus concept formation tasks.  These tasks differ in that, in concept identification tasks, the 
concepts are not formed by the person but are inherent in the test materials.  In contrast, in 
concept formation tasks the concepts have to be self-generated, and the person is required to 
generate the rules in order to group the stimuli.  The researchers found that high-functioning 
individuals with autism had a deficit only in concept formation and that this deficit resulted in 
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cognitive inflexibility and the inability to spontaneously form ways in which to organize 
information.  These results support the notion that individuals with autism process and group 
information in a rule-based manner and are deficient when the task requires that concepts be 
abstracted from complex information. 
A study conducted by Plaisted et al. (1998) provides additional evidence that suggests 
that individuals with autism categorize and form concepts in a manner that is different from 
typically developing individuals.  In this study, control adults were better able to discriminate 
familiar stimuli than novel stimuli.  High-functioning adults with autism, however, were not 
better at discriminating familiar than novel stimuli.  The authors suggested that high-functioning 
adults with autism process features that are common between objects poorly and, therefore, 
process features that are unique to an object well.  If features in common between objects are 
processed poorly, categorization would be affected, because categorization involves the ability to 
determine what aspects of exemplars are common.  If individuals with autism are unable to 
determine the commonality among items, they also may be unable to determine the commonality 
among situations.  This could lead to an inability to use information about prior instances to 
inform new situations resulting in a world that is confusing and overwhelming.  Poor ability to 
process features common to stimuli in conjunction with the ability to process features unique to a 
stimulus well supports the idea of the existence of different categorization processes in 
individuals with autism. 
More recently, Gastgeb et al. (2006) performed a unique study that examined 
categorization processes across development from childhood to adulthood in typically 
developing individuals and individuals with autism.  It was also the first study to consider the 
role of typicality or task difficulty in categorization of natural categories.  The results indicated 
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that both individuals with autism and typically developing individuals showed improvement in 
their categorization abilities throughout the lifespan for all levels of typicality.  In fact, by the 
adolescent years, categorization ability and processing efficiency of typical and somewhat 
typical category members developed to a comparable level in both groups.  In contrast, 
categorization processing differences were found throughout the lifespan with respect to atypical 
or poor category members.  Indeed, adults with autism never reached the same proficiency in 
categorization as the control adults for the atypical category members.  
The results of this study suggest that individuals with autism can readily categorize when 
the task involves simple and typical basic objects but have difficulty when categorization is more 
complex or involves less typical objects.  Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn (1984) suggest that 
atypical stimuli require additional perceptual processing in order to be categorized.  Thus, it is 
possible that individuals with autism have difficulty with the type of additional perceptual 
processes that are needed to categorize atypical stimuli.  For the remainder of this paper, these 
additional perceptual processes will be referred to as “subordinate perceptual processes”, because 
they are equivalent to the types of processes needed for subordinate level categorization (e.g., 
Gauthier, Tarr, Moylan, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 2000).  
 To illustrate these perceptual processes, imagine an atypical piece of furniture that is 
longer than the typical chair but shorter than the typical couch (i.e., a loveseat).  How does one 
decide whether this piece of furniture is a chair or not?  One cannot use the simple, criterial 
feature of “short or not short” to decide category membership, because length does not provide 
enough clear information for this decision.  Rather than comparing only simple features, 
comparisons of subordinate or atypical category members require that quantitative spatial 
information be considered (e.g., subtle differences in the length of a couch versus a chair).  
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Additionally, when categorizing atypical or subordinate exemplars, it is necessary to do a careful 
comparison of the exemplar to stored category members or to a prototype of the category and 
decide if the piece of furniture looks more like the prototype or stored exemplars of couches or 
chairs (Homa, Smith, & Macak, 2001).  Finally, categorizing atypical and subordinate exemplars 
may require the comparison of multiple features and the ability to flexibly weight these features 
in the decision process.  For example, because the length of a loveseat is at the category 
boundary, other features such as style, fabric, and so on may take on greater weight in the 
categorization decision.  If individuals with autism have difficulty forming a prototype or do so 
differently than typically developing individuals, they would need to engage in different 
processes in order to categorize atypical category members and possibly even other information 
in their environments.  
To date, no studies have explored the role that subordinate perceptual processes may play 
in the object categorization of individuals with autism.  However, direct evidence that 
individuals with autism have difficulty with subordinate perceptual processes comes from the 
face literature.  It is important to note that the corresponding terms for subordinate perceptual 
processes in the face literature are configural and holistic processes.  Many studies have found 
that individuals with autism process faces more featurally or part-based rather than using more 
subtle quantitative comparisons (e.g., Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & 
Cohen, 2002; Joseph & Tanaka, 2003).  There is also evidence that individuals with autism are 
unable to abstract prototypes or average representations of faces (Gastgeb, Rump, Best, 
Minshew, & Strauss, 2009).  Finally, a recent study (Strauss et al., in submission) on gender 
categorization found that, although individuals with autism were able to accurately categorize the 
gender of faces that were typical examples of men or women, they had difficulty (in terms of 
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both accuracy and reaction time) with categorizing atypical exemplars of gender which requires 
more subtle quantitative comparisons for successful categorization.  Thus, the face literature 
provides evidence of deficits in two of the subordinate level perceptual processes, a lack of 
subtle quantitative comparisons when processing faces and an inability to abstract prototypes or 
average features of faces. 
1.3 PROTOTYPE FORMATION IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
Temple Grandin, a high-functioning adult with autism who is well-known for her books 
and lectures on autism, describes what it is like to think differently than other people, “My cat or 
church or steeple concept is based on a series of ‘videos’ of different cats or churches that I have 
experienced. There is no generalized cat concept” (Grandin, 1995, p. 142).  Grandin does not 
believe that she forms prototypes or generalized representations of the objects that she sees or 
learns about in the world but stores videos of each exact item that she has experienced in her 
memory. 
 Although there has been relatively little research on prototype formation in autism, there 
are a few studies that suggest that individuals with autism are unable to abstract a prototype or 
average representation of the features of an object category.  Klinger and Dawson (2001) 
compared low-functioning children with autism, children with Down’s syndrome, and typically 
developing children’s abilities to use rule-based and prototype category learning.  The authors 
found that all groups were able to categorize using a rule-based strategy when the rule was 
explicitly stated and when the rule was implicit, but neither the children with autism nor Down’s 
syndrome were able to abstract a prototype of simple animal-like categories during category 
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learning.  Additionally, individuals with autism and Down’s syndrome were able to categorize 
the animal-like exemplars only when there was a single distinctive feature present such as “long 
feet.”  Typically developing children, however, did not exhibit any difficulties with abstracting a 
prototype.  Plaisted (2000) discussed two unpublished studies that indicated that high-
functioning adults and children with autism matched with controls on general cognitive level 
were also unable to form prototypes.  More recently, Klinger, Klinger, and Pohlig (2006) 
replicated the Klinger and Dawson (2001) study using a larger number of high-functioning 
children ranging from 5 to 17 years of age and again found a significant difference between the 
control children and children with autism on a prototype formation task.  As a result, the inability 
to form prototypes in the Klinger and Dawson (2001) study probably cannot be explained by 
mental retardation or general level of cognitive functioning.  
In contrast, Molesworth, Bowler, and Hampton (2005) failed to find a lack of prototype 
formation in high functioning children with autism and Asperger’s disorder.  The first study on 
the formation of an average (or mean) prototype utilized stimuli that consisted of a combination 
of six features that varied on a quantitative dimension of six different values (i.e., different sizes 
from 1 to 6, with 1 being the smallest and 6 being the largest).  The participants were 
familiarized with stimuli comprised of all features with size values equal to 2 or 5 and then were 
shown a variety of stimuli and had to decide if they had seen each stimulus before or not.  The 
second study on formation of a modal prototype utilized stimuli that consisted of a combination 
of six features that varied on a qualitative dimension of five different values (i.e., different 
shapes from 1 to 5).  The participants were familiarized with stimuli that shared three out of six 
features with the prototype and then again were shown a variety of stimuli that they had to 
decide if they had seen before or not.  In both studies, the authors found that individuals with 
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autism were able to form a prototype and exhibited a full prototype effect.  This was evidenced 
by a false memory for an unseen prototype in both studies.  The authors concluded that the result 
of an intact prototype effect in individuals with autism was due to methodological differences in 
their study such as studying a higher functioning group of children with autism, using cartoon 
animal stimuli, and requiring simple responses from the children.  
More recently, Molesworth, Bowler, and Hampton (2008) replicated their findings and 
again found an intact prototype effect in high functioning children with autism and Asperger’s 
disorder using a different test procedure.  This study utilized stimuli that were created using the 
same criteria as the first study in their 2005 paper.  Again, participants were familiarized with 
stimuli that were labeled “medium family resemblance” (medium FR) and were comprised of all 
features with size values equal to 2 or 5.  During this familiarization phase, cards depicting 
medium FR members of two different categories (e.g., Hov and Mek) were placed in front of the 
participants.  The participants were instructed to study these cards and all additional cards for 
three minutes.  The experimenter then handed the cards to the participants one at a time and 
encouraged them to study each card and then place it face up on the pile of cards from the same 
category.  During the test phase, the participants were shown three stimuli from one of the 
categories: the prototype, a new medium FR stimulus, and a low FR stimulus (a stimulus 
comprised of all features with size values equal to 1 or 6).  The participants were instructed to 
look at the choices and to choose the best member of the category (e.g., the best Hov).  They 
were then presented a test trial for the other familiarization category.  The entire familiarization 
and test procedure was repeated two more times for a total for six categories.  The authors found 
that individuals with autism showed a prototype effect with the prototype being chosen as the 
best member of the category more than the medium FR stimuli which were chosen more than the 
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low FR stimuli.  There were no differences between the autism group and the control group for 
the low FR, medium FR, or prototype stimuli.  It was again concluded that the result of an intact 
prototype effect in individuals with autism was due to studying a higher functioning group of 
children with autism. 
However, it is possible that the “intact prototype formation” results found by Molesworth 
et al. (2005, 2008) were due to other reasons that were not discussed.  First, the autism groups 
included both high-functioning children with autism and children with Asperger’s disorder.  
While there has not been much evidence that these two disorders on the autism spectrum are 
qualitatively different in terms of neuropsychological functioning, it is unknown whether their 
cognitive processes (such as the ability to form a prototype) are the same.  In fact, a recent study 
by Mazefsky and Oswald (2007) found a difference in emotion perception between individuals 
with Asperger’s disorder and those with high-functioning autism.  In this study, individuals with 
Asperger’s disorder performed equally well as typically developing individuals, but individuals 
with autism performed significantly worse than both groups on measures of emotion perception.  
This suggests that it may be important to examine these groups separately when studying other 
types of categorization.  Second, it is unclear whether individuals with autism formed a prototype 
in the studies on the formation of an average or mean prototype (study 1 in the 2005 paper and 
the 2008 replication), or just determined what features were varying.  The features that were 
varied were fairly obvious and the differences between the values were not very subtle.  Thus, it 
is possible that the individuals with autism formed an average of each feature or possibly just one 
feature but did not actually form prototypes of the learned categories.  Finally, it is also unclear 
whether individuals with autism formed a prototype in the second study in the 2005 paper, the 
study on the formation of a modal prototype.  In this case, the features that varied were 
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quantitative (shape), and therefore it is possible that the individuals with autism falsely 
remembered the prototype because they remembered the features that had a value of 1 (the 
values that made up the prototype) which were also shown more frequently than the other values 
during the familiarization phase (since all familiarization stimuli shared three out of six features 
with the prototype).  Thus, the individuals with autism may have shown a prototype effect due to 
memorization of specific features rather than the formation of a prototype. 
Only one study to date has examined the ability of individuals with autism to form a 
prototype of faces.  Gastgeb, Rump, Best, Minshew, and Strauss (2009) tested high-functioning 
children and adults with autism and matched controls on a face prototype task patterned after a 
study originally conducted on both adults and 10-month-old infants (Strauss, 1979).  Participants 
were presented with 14 schematic drawings of faces varying on four facial dimensions – eye 
separation, nose width, nose placement height, and head length.  There were three values of each 
dimension (e.g., wide, narrow, and average nose widths).  Across the 14 faces, participants saw 
the two extreme values of each feature 12 times and the average value only twice.  Participants 
were then presented with two test faces, the prototype (which contained the average value on all 
dimensions) and a face consisting of values that were more frequently experienced, and asked to 
say which face looked more familiar   Results indicated that 78% of the adults in the control 
group chose the prototype as more familiar than the face comprised of features that were more 
frequently seen while only 55% of the adults with autism chose the prototype.  For the child 
groups, 69% of the typically developing children chose the prototype as more familiar while only 
48% of the children with autism chose the prototype (chance).  These results add to those of 
Klinger and colleagues, suggesting that individuals with autism also have difficulty forming 
mean prototypes of facial information.  This study suggests that individuals with autism do not 
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automatically abstract prototypical information during an exposure paradigm with passive face 
viewing. 
Gastgeb et al. (2009) provided a more stringent test of mean prototype formation than 
previous studies for several reasons.  First, Gastgeb and colleagues used faces, a natural category 
exhibiting subtle featural variations that are quantitative in nature.  Second, stimuli were 
designed using subtle variations of continuous facial attributes that were combined to ensure 
participants saw mean prototype values less frequently than mode prototype values.  Thus, pure 
memorization of features would have resulted in individuals choosing the mode prototype more 
often which did not occur.  It is possible that the results reflected chance behavior; however, the 
control group showed clear evidence of selecting the mean prototype at levels greater than 
chance.  It may also be argued that the results of the autism group were not due to a difference in 
mean prototype formation but rather a general face perception deficit from reduced attention to 
faces resulting in less experience with faces.  Since infants have minimal experience with faces 
and can abstract mean prototypes, this possibility is less likely but cannot be ruled out.    
1.4 CURRENT STUDY   
The results from the few prototype formation studies that have been published thus far 
suggest that individuals with autism engage in different categorization processes than typically 
developing individuals and that these differences may be very basic and early developing 
(Klinger & Dawson, 1995; Strauss, Newell, & Best, 2003).  An inability to abstract prototypes in 
individuals with autism is surprising due to the fact that studies on prototype formation in 
children have established that infants are able to abstract prototypes (Strauss, 1979; Younger, 
 17 
1985, 1990).  An early deficit in the mechanisms used to form prototypes would result in infants 
having difficulty decreasing the amount of information in a complex environment and easily 
becoming overstimulated by sensory information.  Given the complexity of social information, 
infants may find it more adaptive to tune out social information rather than pay attention to it.  
Thus, previous results concerning a potential deficit in prototype formation need to be replicated 
in more samples of individuals with autism using a variety of stimuli in order to better 
understand prototype formation abilities in individuals with autism.  
Also, studies to date are unable to provide any information about what the individuals 
with autism and typically developing individuals are attending to or looking at when they are 
forming prototypes or categories.  Individuals with autism may spend less time in general 
looking at or attending to the training/familiarization stimuli.  Another possibility is that they 
may appear to be looking at the stimuli but may actually be looking at the corner or other 
irrelevant parts of the stimulus where there is no relevant information about the category.  
Individuals with autism may also attend to specific parts of the stimulus rather than to the whole 
stimulus.  Any or all of the above information may provide an explanation for why individuals 
with autism have difficulty forming prototypes or categories.  Thus, it is important for 
researchers to use technology such as eye-tracking in order to examine what areas of the 
face/object are being examined during the familiarization or training phases.  By doing so, 
researchers not only determine if individuals with autism have difficulty forming prototypes or 
categories but also why they have difficulty. 
Finally, no studies on prototype formation in autism to date have examined whether 
individuals with autism evidence difficulty in prototype formation in both social and non-social 
domains.  Researchers have studied formation of prototypes using faces or cartoon animals, but 
 18 
have not examined prototype formation for more than one type of stimulus in the same 
participants.  It is possible that the difficulties that individuals with autism have with prototype 
formation are domain-general and that all domains (e.g., social and non-social) are equally 
affected.  It is also possible that individuals with autism have difficulty forming prototypes 
across multiple domains but that the deficit is more prominent in the social domain due to the 
increased amount of variability.   
The current set of studies aimed to provide answers to the above questions by first 
replicating the findings of previous prototype studies in another group of high-functioning adults 
with autism.  Both a face prototype study (Experiment 1) and a dot prototype study (Experiment 
2) were included in order to determine whether individuals with autism have difficulty with 
prototype formation across both social (faces) and non-social (dots) domains.  The participants’ 
eye movements were recorded in order to gather vital information about which areas of the faces 
or dot patterns individuals with autism and control individuals fixated on when looking at the 
familiarization trials (learning).  
1.4.1 Specific Aims 
The general aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether individuals with autism have 
difficulty forming a prototype of facial information.  As stated earlier, it is a well known and 
well replicated finding that individuals with autism have deficits in face perception and 
recognition.  Thus, it is important to know whether individuals with autism can form a prototype 
of a face and whether they look at all of the relevant parts of the faces that are presented (i.e., the 
parts that vary from one face to another).  Also, the only previous study on face prototype 
formation in autism (Gastgeb et al., 2009) used schematic line drawings of faces rather than 
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natural faces.  The current study utilized natural faces in order to more closely replicate the facial 
information that is abstracted in real life categorization.  Individuals with autism were 
familiarized with sets of faces and after each set chose which face was more familiar, the 
prototype face or a face comprised of features that were previously seen (mode face).   
Experiment 1 had four aims: 
1. To investigate whether individuals with autism experience difficulty abstracting 
prototypes of facial information with naturalistic faces. 
2. To determine whether facial prototype formation ability is related to measures 
of intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, or the social, communication, 
and behavioral symptoms of autism. 
3. To use eye-tracking technology to investigate what areas of the stimulus and/or 
face typically developing individuals and individuals with autism attend to or 
look at when forming a prototype of faces. 
4. To examine individual differences in the ability to abstract prototypes in 
individuals with autism.  For example, how variable are the abilities of 
individuals with autism to abstract prototypes, and is there a subset of 
individuals with autism who are successfully able to form a facial prototype?  If 
so, do these individuals differ from those who are unable to successfully form a 
facial prototype on measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, 
symptoms of autism, or eye-tracking measures? 
The general aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether individuals with autism have 
difficulty forming a prototype of non-social information which in this study was dot patterns.  
Dot prototype studies have been used to study prototype formation in typically developing 
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individuals from infancy to adulthood in addition to clinical populations such as Alzheimer’s 
disease (Kéri et al., 1999; Kéri, Kálmán, et al., 2001), schizophrenia (Kéri, Kelemen, et al., 2001) 
and mental retardation (Hays & Conway, 2000).  This suggests that it is a good paradigm for 
studying prototype formation in autism.  Dot patterns are also good stimuli for prototype 
formation studies, because the participants have no prior knowledge of or experience with 
categorizing dot patterns.  Thus, a study of dot prototype formation provides information about 
the pure process of prototype formation and how individuals with autism deal with perceptual 
variability without any possible confounds of experience.  Experiment 2 is based on a study by 
Kéri, Kálmán, et al. (2001).  Dot stimuli that were in the same dot pattern category as the 
prototype were created by moving dots either a small distance from their placement in the 
prototype (low distortion) or a large distance from their placement in the prototype (high 
distortion).  Dot stimuli from another dot category were also created (non-category).  Individuals 
with autism and control individuals were familiarized with high distortions of a prototype dot 
pattern and then tested on their ability to correctly categorize dot patterns that were the 
prototype, low distortions of the prototype, new high distortions of the prototype, and non-
category patterns (patterns from another dot pattern category).  
Experiment 2 had four aims: 
1. To investigate whether individuals with autism experience difficulty abstracting 
prototypes of dot pattern information 
2.  To determine whether dot prototype formation ability is related to measures of 
intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, or the social, communication, and 
behavioral symptoms of autism. 
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3. To use eye-tracking technology to investigate what areas of the stimulus and/or 
dot pattern typically developing individuals and individuals with autism attend 
to or look at when forming a prototype of dot patterns. 
4. To examine individual differences in the ability to abstract dot prototypes in 
individuals with autism.  For example, how variable are the abilities of 
individuals with autism to abstract dot prototypes, and is there a subset of 
individuals with autism who are able to successfully form a prototype of dot 
patterns?  If so, do these individuals differ from those who are not able to 
successfully form a prototype of dot patterns on measures of intelligence, low-
level perceptual processing, symptoms of autism, or eye-tracking measures? 
1.4.2 Hypotheses 
For Experiment 1, it was hypothesized that: 
 
1. Control participants would consider the prototype faces to be more familiar 
than faces comprised of feature values that have been previously viewed.   
2. There would be a deficit in the formation of a face prototype in individuals with 
autism in that they would not consider the prototype faces to be more familiar 
than faces comprised of feature values that have been previously viewed.  
3. There would be significant group difference between the percentages of 
prototype faces chosen as familiar with control participants choosing the 
prototype faces significantly more often than the individuals with autism. 
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4. If a subset of individuals with autism form a prototype, these individuals would 
engage in different patterns of eye fixations or differ from individuals who do 
not form a prototype on measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, or the social, communication, and behavioral symptoms of autism. 
5. Control participants would show a pattern of eye fixations that involves looking 
at many areas of the faces including the parts of the faces that vary from one 
face to another during the familiarization trials. 
6. Individuals with autism would show a pattern of eye fixations that involves 
looking at fewer or irrelevant aspects of the faces during the familiarization 
trials.   
7. There would be no group difference in the percentage of time spent looking at 
the faces during the familiarization trials. 
 
For Experiment 2, it was hypothesized that: 
 
1. Control individuals’ results would parallel those from Kéri, Kálmán, et al. 
(2001) in that the prototype would be correctly categorized more often than the 
low distortions which in turn would be categorized correctly more often than 
the high distortions.  The non-category distortions would be categorized as 




2. Individuals with autism would not show the same pattern of results as the 
control individuals and would evidence difficulty forming the dot pattern 
prototype.  One possibility is that all individuals with autism would have 
difficulty abstracting a prototype which would be evidenced by relatively little 
difference between performance on the prototype, high distortion, and low 
distortion stimuli.  It is also possible that the individuals with autism or a subset 
of individuals with autism would have some abstraction abilities but that their 
abilities would be more limited.  This would be evidenced by successful 
categorization of prototype and low distortion exemplars but difficulty with 
categorizing high distortion exemplars that are less like the prototype.  
3. There would be significant group difference between the percentages of dot 
patterns endorsed as category members with control participants correctly 
categorizing all stimuli more often than the individuals with autism. 
4. If a subset of individuals with autism perform better on the dot prototype task, 
these individuals would engage in different patterns of eye fixations or differ 
from individuals who do not form a prototype or who only evidence some 
abstraction abilities on measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, or the social, communication, and behavioral symptoms of autism. 
5. Control participants would show a pattern of eye fixations that involves looking 
at all or most of the dots in the dot patterns during the familiarization phase.   
6. Individuals with autism would look at fewer dots or fixate on certain regions of 
the dot patterns during the familiarization phase.  
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7.  There would be no group difference in the percentage of time spent looking at 
the dot patterns during the familiarization trials. 
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2.0  EXPERIMENT 1: FACE PROTOTYPE 
2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of 20 high-functioning adult males with autism and 20 healthy 
control adult males recruited by the Pittsburgh Autism Center for Excellence (ACE) at the 
University of Pittsburgh.  All participants provided written informed consent according to the 
guidelines of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Institutional Review Board and were 
paid for their participation in the study.  Control participants were recruited through posters, 
newspaper advertisements, radio ads, and community television announcements.  Individuals 
with autism were recruited through informational visits to service providers throughout the state 
of Pennsylvania and the surrounding states, fliers at autism meetings, advertisements in autism 
newsletters, and posters.  No restrictions were placed on ethnicity, location of residence, or SES.  
Participants were recruited and matched according to the following criteria:  
2.1.1.1  General Inclusion Criteria 
In order to participate, all individuals were required to have full-scale and verbal IQs 
greater than 80 as determined by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999).  They were also required to be between 17 and 50 years of age and in good 
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medical health.  The lower age limit existed in order to exclude any effects that may have been 
the result of continued development of skills through adolescence while the upper age limit 
existed in order to reduce the effects of normal aging on behavior and brain function.  The IQ 
limit existed for two reasons.  One reason is that the nature of the study required verbal 
comprehension abilities that may not be present in lower functioning individuals with autism.  
Also, studying high-functioning individuals with autism allows for the discovery of cognitive 
differences and potential deficits that are specific to autism and not the non-specific 
consequences of mental retardation. 
2.1.1.2   Inclusion-Exclusion Criteria for Participants with Autism 
Participants with autism were also required to: 1) meet DSM-IV-TR criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) for autism on the basis of the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) and the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, Goode, Heemsbergen, Jordan, Mawhood, & Schopler, 1989) 
with confirmation by expert clinical opinion; 2) have no evidence of underlying cause for autism 
on the basis of physical examination, neurologic history and examination, and chromosomal 
analysis; 3) be free of seizure disorder and major depression at the time of the study; and 4) have 
a clinically significant delay in language (exclusion of those with pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified and Asperger’s disorder). 
2.1.1.3  Inclusion- Exclusion Criteria for Control Participants 
The control participants were also required to: 1) be free of neurologic disorders currently 
and in the past on the basis of neurologic history obtained with a questionnaire; 2) be free of 
psychiatric disorders currently and in the past on the basis of a semi-structured interview 
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designed to ascertain present episode and lifetime history of psychiatric illnesses according to 
DSM-IV criteria (Adult Symptom Inventory-4, Gadow, Sprafkin, & Weiss, 1999); 3) have a 
negative family history in first degree relatives of affective and anxiety disorders or other major 
psychiatric disorders based on the Family History Screen (Weissman, Wickramaratne, Adams, 
Wolk, Verdeli, & Olfson, 2000); 4) have a negative family history in first and second degree 
relatives of autism or other autism spectrum disorders; 5) have no historical evidence of 
significant difficulty during pregnancy, labor, delivery, or immediate neonatal period or 
abnormal developmental milestones as determined by questionnaire; 6) have a history of school 
attendance and grades consistent with ability level; 7) have no evidence by history or school 
records of a disparity between general level of ability and academic achievement; and 8) have no 
history of a loss of consciousness.  The exclusion of controls with a history in first degree 
relatives of affective disorders, anxiety disorders and autism spectrum disorders or a history of 
autism spectrum disorders in first and second degree relatives was aimed at excluding those with 
potential autism susceptibility genes, because these disorders occur more often in autism 
families. 
2.1.1.4  Matching Criteria for Participant Groups 
Control participants were matched to the autism group (same mean) on age, full scale IQ 
(FSIQ), verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ) and gender.  Initially controls were recruited 
broadly across the age range, and as participants with autism were recruited, the recruitment of 
controls was tailored to achieve matching.  Table 1 summarizes the participants’ demographic 
characteristics.  No significant differences were found between the two groups on age, FSIQ, 
VIQ, or PIQ.   
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Table 1.  Participants’ Diagnostic and Demographic Characteristics for Experiment 1 
                       _ _________________________________________________________ 
            Autism Group (n = 20)                        Control Group (n = 20) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                            M (SD)          (Range)      M (SD) (Range)   
CA  22.85  (6.16)   (17-39)  25.45  (6.29) (18 – 42)   
VIQ  107.40 (10.77)  (88 – 127)  111.00 (7.20) (94 – 122)   
PIQ  108.30 (13.24)  (83 – 131)  110.50 (8.96) (93 – 125)   
FSIQ  108.65 (9.17)   (92 – 128)  112.35 (7.90) (97 – 122)   
 
 
Note.  CA = Chronological Age in years; VIQ = Verbal IQ; PIQ = Performance IQ;    
 FSIQ = Full Scale IQ 
 
2.1.2 Apparatus 
Testing occurred in a quiet, dark laboratory room in a testing booth surrounded by black 
curtains.  Each participant was seated in a modified desk chair and made comfortable.  Stimuli 
were displayed using Tobii Studio on a rear projection screen that was positioned approximately 
152 cm in front of the participant.  Eye movements were recorded by means of the Tobii X120 
stand-alone eye tracker, with a sampling rate of 60 Hz, accuracy of 0.5 degrees of visual angle, 
spatial resolution of 0.2 degrees, and drift of 0.3 degrees.  The device was positioned in front of 
the participant and below where the stimuli were projected on the screen.  Participants were also 
videotaped during the entire procedure to ensure that they engaged in the task and remained still 
in the chair. 
2.1.3 Stimulus Materials 
Six sets of faces (three sets of male faces and three sets of female faces) were created 
using the following method.  For each set of faces, stimuli consisted of 20 exemplars (16 
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familiarization exemplars and four test exemplars) created by manipulating specific features and 
spatial distances between features of a photograph of a natural face with average features.  The 
features and spatial distances that were manipulated included nose/mouth distance, nose width, 
forehead height, and lip thickness.  The non-manipulated original face was designated as the 
“prototype” stimulus (see Figure 1).   
 
                                          
             Narrow Mode                             Prototype                           Wide Mode 
Figure 1. Narrow Mode, Prototype, and Wide Mode Stimulus Examples for Experiment 1 
 
Exemplars were generated by manipulating each of the four facial aspects or distances to 
either be larger or wider than the original (values 3 and 4) or smaller or narrower than the 
original (values 1 and 2) using the Face Fun facial morphing program.  For example, faces were 
generated that had wider noses than the original (values 3 and 4) and others had narrower noses 
than the original (values 1 and 2).  No exemplar had the same nose width as the original and nose 
width was manipulated by equal amounts from one value to the next.  This was true of all four 
facial aspects that were manipulated (see Table 2).  The nose/mouth distance subtended a visual 
angle between 1.13 degrees for the narrowest manipulation to 1.70 degrees for the widest 
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manipulation.  Nose width subtended a visual angle between 2.75 degrees and 3.20 degrees.  
Forehead height subtended a visual angle between 4.90 degrees and 6.03 degrees.  Lip thickness 
subtended a visual angle between .94 degrees and 1.51 degrees.  
For each set of faces, the familiarization stimuli consisted of 16 stimuli and within these 
stimuli, each value for each facial aspect or distance was seen four times.  For example, for nose 
width, four faces had a nose width value of 1, four had a value of 2, four had a value of 3, and 
four had a value of 4.  Across all six sets of faces, 96 familiarization stimuli were created.  The 
familiarization face stimuli subtended a visual angle of 12 x 19 degrees. 
Four faces that were comprised of all of the same values of each facial aspect (e.g., all 
values of 1, all values of 2, etc.) were also created for each set of faces.  Thus, these faces were 
comprised of values that were seen an equal number of times during the familiarization trials.  
The faces comprised of all features with a value of 1 or 4 were designated as the “wide modes”, 
because the difference between the mode and the prototype was the largest (widest) amount 
possible.  The faces comprised of all features with a value of 2 or 3 were designated as the 
“narrow modes”, because the difference between the mode and the prototype was the smallest 
(narrowest) amount possible.  Across all six sets of faces, 16 mode stimuli were created.  Table 2 
shows example values of the modified facial aspects for the stimuli in each set.    
For each set of faces, eight stimulus pairs (test stimuli) were created which consisted of 
the prototype face (original non-manipulated face) next to one of the narrow modes or the 
prototype face next to one of the wide modes.  For half of the stimulus pairs, the prototype was 
on the right side of the pair, and for the other half of the stimulus pairs, the prototype was on the 
left side of the pair.  Across all six sets of faces, 48 test stimuli were created.  The test stimuli 
subtended a visual angle of 28 x 19 degrees. 
 31 
Table 2.  Example Values of Modified Facial Aspects for Experiment 1 Stimuli 
      Stimulus                     Nose/Mouth              Nose              Forehead                Lip 
                        Distance                Width               Height              Thickness 
1      1             1                       2                       4 
2                                     1                              2                       3                       3 
3                                     1                              3                       4                       1 
4                                     1                              4                       1                       2 
5                                     2                              1                       3                       2 
6                                     2                              2                       4                       1 
7                                     2                              3                       1                       4 
8                                     2                              4                       2                       3 
9                                     3                              1                       4                       2 
10                                   3                              2                       1                       3 
11                                   3                              3                       2                       4     
12                                   3                              4                       3                       1 
13                                   4                              1                       3                       4 
14                                   4                              2                       4                       3 
15                                   4                              3                       1                       2 
16                                   4                              4                       2                       1 
Wide Mode                    1                              1                      1                       1 
Wide Mode                    4                              4                      4                       4 
Narrow Mode                2                              2                       2                      2 
Narrow Mode                3                              3                       3                      3 
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Familiarization and test stimuli were programmed into four different presentation orders 
using Tobii Studio.  For each presentation order, the six sets of faces were presented in a 
different predetermined order in blocks.  In each block, the familiarization stimuli for one set of 
faces were presented in randomized order followed by two test trials, first one of the wide modes 
vs. the prototype (Wide condition), and then one of the narrow modes vs. the prototype (Narrow 
condition).  This was repeated for a total of six blocks.  Each test pair was presented an equal 
number of times across the four different presentation orders, and it was ensured that the 
prototype was presented on the left and on the right an equal number of times within each 
presentation order. 
2.1.4 Procedure 
For each participant, one of the four different presentation orders was randomly selected.  
Each participant was familiarized with the eye-tracking equipment and seated in a chair 
approximately 152 cm from the rear projection screen.  During calibration, the participant was 
required to look at the calibration points on the screen in front of him.  The calibration procedure 
was repeated until it was successful.  Once the calibration was successfully completed, the 
participant was provided the following instructions: 
“This study involves faces.  I am going to show you some faces on the screen one at a 
time.  All you have to do is look at the faces the whole time they are on the screen.”   
The participant was then shown the first block of familiarization trials consisting of 16 
manipulated face exemplars in a randomized order.  All familiarization faces remained on the 
screen for two seconds with an interstimulus interval of one second.  At the end of the 
familiarization period, the participant was given a response pad with two buttons.  Above the left 
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button was an arrow pointing to the left side of the screen and above the right button was an 
arrow pointing to the right side of the screen.  The participant was then given the following 
instructions:  
“Now you are going to see two faces on the screen at the same time.  I want you to decide 
which face looks more familiar to you.  In other words, which face looks like you have seen it 
before?  See how each button has an arrow pointing to one side of the screen?  When you have 
decided which face is more familiar, I want you to push the button that goes with that face.  It is 
important for you to push the button as quickly as possible.  Ready?”  
Once the participant was ready, the first test trial was presented.  This trial consisted of 
the prototype face vs. one of the wide modes (Wide condition).  Once the participant responded 
as to which face was more familiar, a white screen was presented followed by the second test 
trial.  This trial consisted of the prototype face vs. one of the narrow modes (Narrow condition).  
Each test trial remained on the screen until the participant responded by pressing a button. 
Following the first block of trials and before each subsequent block of trials, an 
instruction slide was presented and the following instructions were given: 
“Now you are going to see more faces of a new person.  All you have to do is look at the 
faces the whole time they are on the screen.” 
Following the second set of familiarization trials and before each new set of test trials, the 
following instructions were given: 
“Now you are going to see two faces again.  I want you to decide which face looks more 
familiar to you, like you have seen it before.  When you have decided, push the button that goes 
with that face.  Remember, it is important for you to push the button as quickly as possible.  
Ready?” 
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This procedure was repeated until all six blocks of trials were completed.  During the 
entire procedure, the participant’s eye movements were recorded in order to determine which 
part(s) of the face the participant looked at when viewing the familiarization faces.  The 
participant’s responses were also recorded by Tobii Studio.   
Following the completion of the experiment, each participant was administered the 
Kaufman Short Neuropsychological Assessment Procedure (K-SNAP) Gestalt Closure subtest in 
order to measure low-level perception.  The K-SNAP Gestalt Closure consists of 25 partially 
completed inkblot pictures.  Participants were shown each inkblot one at a time and asked, 
“What is this?”  Their responses were recorded, and administration was discontinued when the 
participant produced five consecutive incorrect answers.  All raw scores were converted to T-
scores for use in analyses.  This measure was included in order to provide information about how 
participants processed perceptual information.  Specifically, it was aimed at determining whether 
participants showed strong central coherence and were able to use global perceptual processing 
to “fill-in” the inkblots into a coherent picture or whether they evidenced weak central coherence 
or enhanced local processing and had difficulty with this task.   
2.1.5 Eye-tracking Data Preparation (AOIs) 
All familiarization stimuli were partitioned into areas of interest (AOIs) corresponding to 
the following areas: eyes, nose, mouth, forehead, face, and whole stimulus.  The Eyes AOI was 
drawn as a box that extended vertically from the top of the eyebrows to the bottom of the orbital 
and horizontally from the left hairline to the right hairline.  The Nose AOI was drawn as a box 
that extended vertically from the Eyes AOI to halfway between the nose and the mouth and 
horizontally from slightly to the left of the outer edge left nostril to slightly to the right of the 
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outer edge of the right nostril.  The distance between the top lip and the Nose AOI was 
measured, and this distance was used to determine the bottommost point of the Mouth AOI (e.g., 
the same distance below the bottommost point of the bottom lip).  Therefore, the Mouth AOI was 
drawn as a box that extended vertically from the Nose AOI to the calculated point below the 
bottom lip and horizontally from the left edge of the face to the right edge of the face.  The 
Forehead AOI was drawn to include the entire forehead area.  The Forehead AOI extended 
vertically from the upper hairline to the Eyes AOI and horizontally from the left hairline to the 
right hairline.  The Face AOI was drawn to include the whole face while excluding the hair and 
ears.  The Stimulus AOI (labeled All in Figure 2) was drawn as a box that included the entire 
stimulus (background and face).  Figure 2 shows an example of all AOIs.   
 
                         
Figure 2.  Example AOIs for Experiment 1 
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2.2 RESULTS 
2.2.1 Percent Prototype Selection Data 
The first aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether individuals with autism, in 
contrast to typically developing individuals, have difficulty abstracting prototypes of facial 
information.  Individuals who abstract a prototype are expected to consider the prototype to be 
more familiar than the modal faces.  Individuals who experience difficulty with prototype 
formation will not consider the prototype faces to be more familiar than the modal faces.  In 
order to address this aim, the percentage of prototype faces selected as familiar was the main 
dependent measure of interest.  This percentage provided a measure of how often the prototype 
faces were considered to be more familiar than the modal faces.  If a facial prototype was formed 
during the familiarization phase, the prototype faces would be considered to be more familiar 
than the modal faces.  
A Mean Prototype Score (MPS) for each Condition (Narrow and Wide) was calculated 
across the six test trials by counting the number of times that the prototype was chosen as 
familiar, dividing that number by six, and multiplying the result by 100.  A 2-way ANOVA was 
conducted on the MPS data.  The between subjects variable was Group (Autism vs. Control) and 
the within subject variable was Condition (Narrow vs. Wide).  Results indicated a trend toward a 
significant main effect of Condition, F (1, 38) = 3.76, p < .06, with the prototype faces being 
selected as familiar more often in the Wide condition (M = 61.67%) than the Narrow condition 
(M = 50.83%) across both groups.  Results indicated a significant main effect of Group, F (1, 38) 
= 6.95, p < .05 with the Control group (M = 62.50%) selecting the prototype faces as familiar 
more often than the Autism group (M = 50.00%).   
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The Group X Condition interaction approached significance, F (1, 38) = 2.69, p = .11.  
The MPS data by Condition is presented in Figure 3.  As can be seen, the Autism (M = 50.83%) 
and Control (M = 72.5%) groups significantly differed in their Mean Prototype Scores in the 
Wide condition with the Control group selecting the prototype faces as familiar more often than 
the Autism group (t = -2.96, p < .01).  While the Autism group did not select the prototype faces 
as familiar more often than chance (50%) (t = .17, p = .87), the Control group showed clear 
familiarity for the prototype faces in the Wide condition (t = 4.13, p < .01).  The results for the 
Narrow condition are quite different.  In the Narrow condition, the Autism (M = 49.17%) and 
Control (M = 52.50%) groups did not significantly differ in their Mean Prototype Scores, (t =      
-.46, p =.65).  In fact, neither of these percentages differed from chance (50%) (t = -.15, p = .88 
for the Autism group and t = .51, p = .61 for the Control group).  Thus, neither the Autism nor 
the Control group identified the prototype faces as more familiar then the modal faces in the 




























Figure 3.  Mean Prototype Scores by Condition (* p < .05) 
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While these analyses provide important information regarding between group differences 
in the Mean Prototype Scores, they do not address potential differences in the range or 
distribution of scores between the two groups.  For instance, were there more participants in the 
Control group who showed clear evidence of face prototype formation?  Were there more 
participants in the Autism group who showed clear evidence of a lack of face prototype 
formation?   
Figure 4 presents the distribution of performance in the Wide Condition across groups as 
a frequency plot of the number of participants in each group who chose one, two, three, four, 
five, or six of the prototype stimuli as familiar.  The Wide condition is presented since neither 
group identified the prototype faces are more familiar in the Narrow condition.  It can be seen 
that nine out of twenty participants in the Control group showed clear evidence of face prototype 
formation by choosing the prototype faces as familiar in five or six out of six trials.  However, 
only three participants in the Autism group showed clear evidence of prototype formation.  In 
contrast, five participants in the Control group and twelve participants in the Autism group 
showed clear evidence of a lack of prototype formation by choosing the prototype as familiar in 
three or fewer trials.  Five participants in the Autism group and six participants in the Control 
group chose the prototype faces as familiar in four out of six trials.  Since choosing the prototype 
face as familiar in three out of six trials can be considered to be random or chance level 
performance, it is difficult to know whether choosing the prototype in four out of six trials is 
evidence of prototype formation or not.  A chi-square analysis comparing the distribution of 
clear prototype formers (n = 3 in the Autism group, n = 9 in the Control group) and clear non-
prototype formers (n = 12 in the Autism group, n = 5 in the Control group) revealed a significant 
association between diagnosis and prototype formation, χ2(1) = 5.86, p < .05.  Based on the odds 
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ratio, individuals in the Control group were 7.20 times more likely to show clear evidence of 
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Figure 4.  Distribution of Performance in the Wide Condition across Groups 
 
2.2.2 Relationship between Prototype Formation and Other Abilities 
The second aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether facial prototype formation 
ability is related to measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, or the social, 
communication, or behavioral symptoms of autism.  Correlations between the Mean Prototype 
Scores and measures of intelligence (VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ), low-level perceptual processing (K-
SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score), and the social, communication, and behavioral symptoms of 
autism (ADOS Social Interaction Total Score, ADOS Communication Total Score, ADOS Social 
Interaction and Communication Total Score, and ADOS Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted 
Interests Total Score) were calculated.  The correlations were calculated separately for the 
Autism group and the Control group since different variables may be related to performance in 
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each group.  Correlations were only calculated for the Wide condition since neither group 
identified the prototype faces as more familiar in the Narrow condition. 
The correlations between performance on the face prototype task and the other measures 
are presented in Table 3.  It can be seen that the only significant correlation in the Autism group 
was between performance on the face prototype task and the Stereotyped Behavior and 
Restricted Interests Total Score on the ADOS, r = -.70, p < .01.  The Stereotyped Behavior and 
Restricted Interests Total Score on the ADOS is a summary score made up of subscores 
including unusual sensory interest in play materials or people, hand and finger and other 
complex mannerisms, excessive interest in unusual or highly specific topics or objects, and 
compulsions or rituals.  This correlation suggests that poorer performance on the face prototype 
task was related to a higher number of these types of behaviors.  For the Control group, the only 
significant correlation was between performance on the face prototype task and FSIQ, r = .45, p 
< .05.  A closer examination of a scatterplot of the data suggested that the correlation was being 
substantially affected by one participant with a lower FSIQ and lower performance on the face 
prototype task.  When this subject was excluded, the correlation was no longer significant, r = 
.29, p = .22.  Therefore, it appears that individuals with autism with a higher number of 
stereotyped behaviors and restricted and repetitive interests performed more poorly on the face 
prototype task.  Formation of a face prototype was not related to intelligence or performance on a 
low-level perceptual task in either group or to social or communication difficulties in the Autism 






Table 3:  Correlations Between Face Prototype Task Performance and Measures of 




Autism    
(n = 20) 
Control    
(n = 20) 
Control    
(n = 19) 
VIQ 0.03 0.39 0.13 
PIQ 0.13 0.41 0.34 
FSIQ 0.11 0.45* 0.29 
ADOS Social Interaction Total 0.11   
ADOS Communication Total 0.06   
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total 0.10   
ADOS Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted Interests Total -0.70**   
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score 0.38 0.09 0.13 
** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
2.2.3 Eye-tracking Results 
The third aim of Experiment 1 was to use eye-tracking technology to investigate what 
areas of the stimulus and/or face typically developing individuals and individuals with autism 
attend to or look at when forming a prototype of faces.  Of the 20 individuals with autism and 20 
control individuals, 14 individuals in each group were included in the eye-tracking analyses.  Six 
participants in each group were excluded due to poor eye-tracking data (e.g., poor calibration or 
lack of accurate eye-tracking).  As with the full participant set, no significant differences were 
found between the two groups on age, FSIQ, VIQ, or PIQ.   
Of interest was whether the Autism and Control groups differed in the distribution of 
time or proportion of time that they spent looking (% LT) at the face or relevant features during 
the familiarization trials.  Differences in the distribution of time spent looking at the face or 
relevant features could provide important information about why the Autism group did not 
choose the prototype faces as more familiar.  For example, if the Autism group spent less time 
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looking at the faces and more time looking at the background, they would be less likely to form a 
prototype during the familiarization phase.  Similarly, if the Autism group spent less time 
looking at relevant facial features such as the eyes, nose, mouth, and forehead and more time 
looking at irrelevant features such as the cheeks or hairline, they would be less likely to form a 
prototype.  Finally, if the Autism Group focused solely on one facial feature, this would affect 
their ability to form a prototype of the entire face. 
 In order to answer these questions, the dependent measure of interest was the % LT for 
each AOI (% Eyes, % Nose, % Mouth, % Forehead, and % Face).  To calculate the % LT, the 
observation length or the total amount of time spent looking at each AOI was summed across all 
of the familiarization trials.  The % LT for each AOI was then calculated by dividing the total 
amount of time the participant spent looking at each AOI (e.g., Eyes) by the total amount of time 
the participant spent looking at all of the relevant features (i.e., Eyes + Nose + Mouth + 
Forehead) and  multiplying the result by 100. 
Before the % LT data was analyzed, it was important to determine whether the Autism 
and Control groups differed in the amount of time that they spent looking at the Face AOI vs. the 
Stimulus AOI (% Face).   In other words, did the Autism and the Control group differ in the 
proportion of time that they spent looking at the face vs. irrelevant aspects of the stimulus (the 
background).  The % Face was calculated by dividing the total amount of time that participants 
spent looking at the Face AOI (across all familiarization trials) by the total amount of time that 
they spent looking at the Stimulus AOI (across all familiarization trials) and multiplying the 
result by 100.  An independent samples t-test determined that the Autism group (M = 93.03%) 
and Control group (M = 91.21%) did not differ in the percentage of time that they spent looking 
at the faces, t = 1.14, p = .26.  Therefore, the difference between the Autism group and Control 
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group in prototype formation ability was not due to a differential amount of time spent looking at 
the faces. 
As stated above, another possibility to consider is whether the Autism and Control groups 
differed in the amount of time that they spent looking at relevant aspects of the face vs. irrelevant 
aspects of the face (% Relevant).  The % Relevant score was calculated by dividing the total 
amount of time that the participants spent looking at the Eyes, Mouth, Nose, and Forehead AOIs 
(across all familiarization trials) by the total amount of time that they spent looking at the Face 
AOI (across all familiarization trials) and multiplying the result by 100.  An independent samples 
t-test resulted in a marginally significant difference between the Autism group (M = 95.09%) and 
Control group (M = 98.69%) indicating that the Control group spent slightly more time looking 
at the relevant aspects of the faces than the Autism group, t = -1.75, p = .09.  Therefore, it is 
possible that the difference between the Autism group and Control group in prototype formation 
ability may have been due to the Autism group spending less time looking at the relevant aspects 
of the faces.  However, since the Autism group looked at the relevant facial features 95% of the 
time, it is unlikely that less attention to relevant features can account for the lack of a familiarity 
preference for the prototype faces in the Autism group. 
Finally, the % LT data was analyzed in order to examine differences in the distribution of 
time spent looking at the relevant features between the Autism group and the Control group.  The 
% LT data is presented in Figure 5.  A 2-way ANOVA was conducted on the % LT data.  The 
between subjects variable was Group (Autism vs. Control) and the within subject variable was 
Feature (Eyes vs. Nose vs. Mouth vs. Forehead).  Results indicated a significant main effect of 
Feature, F (3, 78) = 33.23, p < .01.  Post-hoc comparisons (Holm-Bonferroni) resulted in 
significant differences between all of the features indicating that both groups spent the largest 
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proportion of time looking at the eyes (M = 48.33%) followed by the nose (M = 32.81%), mouth 
(M = 16.99%), and forehead (M = 1.87%) (p < .01 for all comparisons except Eyes vs. Nose, p < 
.05).  In other words, both groups had the same general pattern of attention to the facial features.  
There was no significant main effect for Group, (F (1, 26) = 1.74, p = .20) nor a significant 
interaction between Group and Condition (F (3, 78) = 1.90, p = .14).  In general, the Control 
group (M = 25.00%) did not differ from the Autism group (M = 25.00%) in the mean percent of 





























Figure 5.  Mean Percent Looking Time by Feature (* p < .05) 
 
Also of interest was whether there were any between group differences in the percentage 
of time spent looking at each feature.  Independent samples t-tests were performed on the % LT 
data for each feature.  As can be seen in Figure 5, the groups did not differ in the percentage of 
time spent looking at noses or foreheads (t = -.26, p = .80 for % Nose and t = 1.34, p = .19 for % 
Forehead).  The Autism group (M = 42.65%) spent a smaller percentage of time looking at eyes 
*
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than the Control group (M = 54.01%), but this difference did not reach significance, t = -1.31, p 
= .20.  This is likely due to the high variability in the % Eyes scores in both groups.  In contrast, 
the Autism group (M = 22.95%) spent a larger percentage of time looking at mouths than the 
Control group (M = 11.02%).  This difference reached statistical significance, t = 2.16, p < .05.  
Therefore, even though the Autism group spent more time looking at the eyes than any other 
feature of the face, they spent less time looking at the eyes and more time looking at the mouth 
than the Control Group.   
2.2.4 Subset Analyses 
The final aim of Experiment 1 was to examine individual differences in the ability to 
abstract prototypes in individuals with autism.  More specifically, it was concerned with whether 
there was a subset of individuals with autism who were able to successfully form a facial 
prototype.  Of particular interest is whether individuals with autism who were able to 
successfully form a prototype differed from those who performed poorly on the facial prototype 
task on measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, symptoms of autism, or eye-
tracking measures.  To this end, the 20 participants with autism were grouped into two 
subgroups, prototype formers and non-prototype formers.  Prototype formers were defined as 
individuals who chose the prototype as familiar in four or more of the six test trials in the Wide 
condition.  Non-prototype formers were defined as individuals who chose the prototype as 
familiar in three or fewer trials in the Wide condition.  The Wide condition was chosen, because 




Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Intelligence, Symptoms of 
Autism, Low-level Perceptual Processing, and Eye-tracking for Prototype Formers and 







Formers         
(n = 8)          
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers         
(n = 12) 
M (SD) 
VIQ 109. 38 (10.10) 106.08 (11.43) 
PIQ 105.87 (13.27) 109.92 (13.55) 
FSIQ 108.00 (6.91) 109.08 (10.70) 
ADOS Social Interaction Total 9.50 (1.60) 8.92 (1.24) 
ADOS Communication Total 5.25 (1.58) 5.17 (.83) 
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total 14.75 (3.11) 14.08 (1.38) 
ADOS Stereotyped Behavior and  Restricted Interests Total ** 1.13 (.83) 3.00 (1.60) 






Formers         
(n = 7)          
M (SD) 
Non-prototype     
Formers         
(n = 7) 
M (SD) 
% Face 92.25 (2.66) 93.81 (3.97) 
% Relevant features 95.42 (7.28) 94.76 (2.55) 
% Eyes 41.84 (19.75) 43.45 (28.97) 
% Nose 34.38 (12.66) 29.64 (17.16) 
% Mouth 21.75 (20.51) 24.16 (18.24) 
% Forehead 2.02 (2.39) 2.76 (2.39) 
 
** p < .01 
 
The means and standard deviations for the measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, symptoms of autism, and eye-tracking for the prototype formers (n = 8 for most 
measures, n = 7 for eye-tracking measures) and non-prototype formers (n = 12 for most 
measures, n = 7 for eye-tracking measures) are presented in Table 4.  Independent samples t-tests 
showed that the only significant difference between the two subgroups was that the prototype 
formers (M = 1.13) had a significantly lower Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted Interests Total 
Score on the ADOS than the non-prototype formers (M = 3.00), t = 3.04, p < .01.  As with the 
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correlations, this suggests that individuals with autism who were able to form a prototype of 
facial information had a lower number of stereotyped and repetitive behaviors.  No other 
between group comparisons were significant. 
A limitation of using the criteria of four out of six trials is that, since choosing the 
prototype face as familiar in three out of six trials can be considered to be random or chance 
level performance, it is difficult to know whether choosing the prototype in four out of six trials 
is evidence of prototype formation or not.  Therefore, a second set of subgroups were formed 
using a more stringent definition of prototype former.  For this set, prototype formers were 
defined as individuals who chose the prototype as familiar in five or more of the six test trials in 
the Wide condition.  Non-prototype formers were defined the same way as in the first set of 
analyses.  Individuals who chose the prototype as familiar in four trials were excluded from these 
subgroups. 
The means and standard deviations for the measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, symptoms of autism, and eye-tracking for the prototype formers (n = 3) and non-
prototype formers (n = 12 for most measures, n = 7 for eye-tracking measures) using a more 
stringent classification criteria are presented in Table 5.  Due to the small sample size for the 
prototype formers, formal statistical tests could not be performed on this data.  However, similar 
to the analyses using the less stringent criteria, prototype formers (M = 1.00) had a lower 
Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted Interests Total Score on the ADOS than the non-prototype 
formers (M = 3.00).  Again, this suggests that individuals with autism who showed clear 
evidence of the ability to form a prototype had a lower number of stereotyped and repetitive 
behaviors.  An additional difference that emerged when more stringent criteria were used was 
that prototype formers (M = 66.67) had higher K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-scores than non-
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prototype formers (M = 54.92).  This suggests that individuals with autism who showed clear 
evidence of prototype formation had a greater ability to engage in global processing or had less 
of a local processing bias than those who were unable to form a prototype of facial information.  
No other between group comparisons were significant. 
 
Table 5:  Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Intelligence, Symptoms of 
Autism, Low-level Perceptual Processing, and Eye-tracking for Prototype Formers and 







Formers         
(n = 3)          
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 12) 
M (SD) 
VIQ 107.33 (11.50) 106.08 (11.43) 
PIQ 116.00 (7.81) 109.92 (13.55) 
FSIQ 112.33 (4.16) 109.08 (10.70) 
ADOS Social Interaction Total 8.67 (.58) 8.92 (1.24) 
ADOS Communication Total 4.67 (.58) 5.17 (.83) 
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total 13.33 (1.15) 14.08 (1.38) 
ADOS Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted Interests Total 1.00 (1.00) 3.00 (1.60) 
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score 66.67 (3.51) 54.92 (10.16) 
 Prototype 
Formers         
(n = 3)          
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 7) 
M (SD) 
% Face 91.53 (1.89) 93.81 (3.97) 
% Relevant features 93.91 (9.69) 94.76 (2.55) 
% Eyes 32.65 (20.13) 43.45 (28.97) 
% Nose 41.42 (14.74) 29.64 (17.16) 
% Mouth 24.08 (11.11) 24.16 (18.24) 




The first aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether individuals with autism, in 
contrast to typically developing individuals, experienced difficulty abstracting prototypes of 
facial information.  Results indicated that the Control group chose the prototype faces as familiar 
72.5% of the time in the Wide condition.  As was hypothesized, the Control group was able to 
distinguish the prototype faces from the modal faces and found the prototype faces to be more 
familiar than faces comprised of features that were previously seen during the familiarization 
phase.  In contrast, the individuals with autism did not choose the prototype faces as familiar at a 
level greater than chance in the Wide or Narrow conditions.  This result supports the second 
hypothesis suggesting that the individuals with autism had a deficit in face prototype formation.  
The third hypothesis was also supported in that the Control group chose the prototype faces as 
familiar more often than the Autism group.  This finding was true for the Wide condition but not 
the Narrow condition.  In fact, in the Wide condition, nine out of twenty participants in the 
Control group showed clear evidence of face prototype formation by choosing the prototype 
faces as familiar five or six out of six trials while only three participants in the Autism group 
showed clear evidence of prototype formation.  It is important to note that neither group chose 
the prototype faces as familiar at greater than chance levels in the Narrow condition.  It is 
possible that the prototype and modal faces were indistinguishable from each other in the Narrow 
condition, resulting in chance behavior in both groups.   
While no specific hypotheses were made, the second aim was to determine whether facial 
prototype formation ability was related to measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, or the social, communication, or behavioral symptoms of autism.  There were no 
significant correlations in the Control group once an outlier participant was removed from the 
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data indicating that performance on the face prototype task was not related to intelligence or low-
level perceptual processing.  The only significant correlation in the Autism group was between 
performance on the face prototype task and the Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted Interests 
Total Score on the ADOS.  The Stereotyped Behavior and Restricted Interests Total Score on the 
ADOS is a summary score made up of subscores including unusual sensory interest in play 
materials or people, hand and finger and other complex mannerisms, excessive interest in 
unusual or highly specific topics or objects, and compulsions or rituals.  This correlation suggests 
that poorer performance on the face prototype task was related to a higher number of these types 
of behaviors.  It is possible that individuals with autism who tend to focus intensely on details, 
parts or irrelevant aspects of objects, or topics of interest are also more likely to focus on specific 
aspects of the face rather than the whole face which would negatively affect prototype formation.  
It is also possible that individuals with autism who do not focus intensely on details, parts or 
irrelevant aspects of objects, or topics of interest are also less likely to focus on specific aspects 
of the face rather than the whole face which would positively affect prototype formation.  These 
possibilities will be discussed in more detail in the General Discussion. 
The third aim was to use eye-tracking technology to investigate what areas of the 
stimulus and/or face typically developing individuals and individuals with autism attended to or 
looked at when forming a prototype of faces.  Eye-tracking data was collected during the 
familiarization trials in order to address why the Autism group did not choose the prototype faces 
as more familiar.  Differences in the distribution of time spent looking at the face or relevant 
features may provide potential explanations for these results.  Examination of eye fixation 
patterns indicated that, as hypothesized, the Autism and Control groups did not differ in the 
amount of time spent looking at the faces.  Therefore, the difference between the Autism group 
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and Control group in prototype formation ability was not due to a differential amount of time 
spent looking at the faces during the familiarization trials.  Also as hypothesized, individuals 
with autism were found to spend less time looking at relevant aspects of the faces during the 
familiarization trials than the Control group.  However, this difference was small, and on 
average, the Autism group spent 95% of the time that they were looking at the faces looking at 
relevant facial features.  Therefore, it is also unlikely that the difference between the Autism 
group and the Control group in prototype formation ability was due to limited attention to 
relevant facial features.   
Examination of between group differences in the percentage of time spent looking at each 
feature determined that even though the Autism group spent more time looking at the eyes than 
any other facial feature, they spent a smaller percentage of time looking at eyes and a larger 
percentage of the time looking at mouths than the Control group.  However, the general pattern 
of attention to the faces for both groups was similar suggesting that differential attention to 
features does not explain the difficulty that the individuals with autism had in the abstraction of 
facial prototypes.  This will be discussed in more detail in the General Discussion section. 
The final aim was to examine individual differences in the ability to abstract prototypes 
in the Autism group.  A closer examination of individual participant’s data in the Autism group 
indicated that there was a subset of individuals with autism who were able to form a prototype of 
facial information in the Wide condition.  A generous definition of prototype former (chose the 
prototype face as familiar in four or more out of six trials) identified eight individuals with 
autism who performed well on the face prototype task while a stringent definition of prototype 
former (chose the prototype face as familiar in five or six out of six trials) identified three 
individuals with autism with intact facial prototype formation abilities.  An important question is 
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whether individuals with autism who were able to form a prototype of facial information differed 
from those who were unable to do so successfully.  Results indicated that the individuals with 
autism who performed best on the facial prototype formation task had fewer restricted and 
repetitive behaviors and interests and had higher scores on the K-SNAP Gestalt Closure task.  
This suggests that there is a small subset of individuals with autism who may be less likely to 
focus intensely on topics and details and may have stronger global processing skills or less 
“weak central coherence.”  These possibilities will be addressed more closely in the General 
Discussion. 
From this experiment, it is unknown whether these results were specific to facial 
information or reflective of a general deficit in prototype formation abilities in individuals with 
autism.  It can be argued that since faces are social, the deficit in prototype formation of facial 
information is a result of a general deficit in social information processing.  In order to determine 
whether there is a general deficit in prototype formation abilities that is present in individuals 
with autism, a second experiment involving non-social stimuli (dot patterns) was performed.  If 
individuals with autism have a general prototype formation deficit, they will also experience 
difficulty forming a prototype of dot patterns. 
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3.0  EXPERIMENT 2: DOT PROTOTYPE 
3.1 METHOD 
3.1.1 Participants 
All recruiting, inclusion, exclusion and matching criteria were identical to Experiment 1.   
While the same number of participants were included in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1 (20 
high-functioning adult males with autism and 20 healthy control adult males), the actual 
participants differed slightly due to equipment difficulties and/or experimenter error.  However, 
17 participants in each group were included in both Experiment 1 and 2.  Table 6 summarizes the 
participants’ demographic characteristics for Experiment 2.  Again, no significant differences 
were found between the two groups on age, FSIQ, VIQ, or PIQ.   
 
Table 6.  Participants’ Diagnostic and Demographic Characteristics for Experiment 2 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
            Autism Group (n = 20)                        Control Group (n = 20) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                         M (SD)            (Range)  M (SD) (Range)   
CA  23.40  (6.64)   (17-37)  26.45  (6.21) (18 – 37)   
VIQ  108.55 (9.83)   (89 – 127)  112.85 (4.94) (100 – 122)   
PIQ  110.70 (12.41)  (83 – 131)  112.40 (8.13) (93 – 125)   
FSIQ  110.55 (7.67)   (98 – 128)  114.30 (6.07) (97 – 121) 
 
 
Note.  CA = Chronological Age in years; VIQ = Verbal IQ; PIQ = Performance IQ; 
FSIQ = Full Scale IQ 
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3.1.2 Apparatus 
The testing apparatus was identical to Experiment 1.  
3.1.3 Stimulus Materials 
Stimuli were constructed following procedures used by Kéri, Kálmán, et al. (2001).  All 
stimuli were created in Excel using a 50 x 50 cell matrix.  The dot prototype was constructed by 
placing nine filled dots into the central 30 x 30 cell area in a pattern very similar to that used as 
the prototype in Kéri, Kálmán, et al. (2001).  Each within category stimulus was constructed by 
systematically distorting the placement of each dot according to a subset of the statistical rules 
and procedures that were used to create distortions of prototype stimuli in a set of studies by 
Posner, Goldsmith, and Welton (1967).  These statistical rules and procedures have been used by 
many researchers studying dot prototype formation in typically developing and clinical 
populations (e.g., Kéri, Kálmán et al., 2001; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Zaki & Nosofsky, 2007). 
Within category stimuli consisted of 20 low distortions of the prototype and 60 high distortions 
of the prototype.  The low distortions were formed using the statistical rules that correspond to 
Posner et al. (1967) distortion level three and the high distortions were formed using the 
statistical rules that correspond to distortion level six.  Table 7 shows the statistical rules for low 






Table 7.  Probabilities of Moving to Each Area for Low and High Levels of Distortion 
                                                              Area  
Level of Distortion                   1  2  3  4  5 
Low                              .59             .20                    .16                  .03                   .02 
High                                .20             .30                    .40                  .05                   .05 
 
The stimuli were created using the following procedure.  A template of 400 cells was 
constructed with the center cell labeled zero, the surrounding eight cells labeled 1-8, the next 
ring of cells numbered 9-24, and the remaining cells numbered 25-399 in a clockwise spiral 
fashion.  Five areas, as seen in Table 7, were assigned consisting of Area 1 (the central cell, cell 
zero), Area 2 (cells 1-8), Area 3 (cells 9-24), Area 4 (cells 25-99), and Area 5 (cells 100-399). 
Each stimulus began as the prototype.  The template was placed over the first dot and a statistical 
calculator was used to calculate which cell of the template the dot would move to according to 
the corresponding probabilities for that stimulus.  The dot was then moved to the cell on the 50 x 
50 grid that corresponded to the cell on the template that was chosen.  This was repeated for all 
nine dots for that stimulus.  Thus, for the low distortion stimuli, each dot had a .59 probability of 
staying in place (Area 1), .20 of moving to Area 2, .16 to Area 3, .03 to Area 4, and .02 to Area 
5.  As a result, the low distortion stimuli were very similar to the prototype stimulus in form.  
The dots in the high distortion stimuli had a zero probability of staying in the same position, and 
therefore all high distortion stimuli were guaranteed to consist of a pattern of dots that was less 
similar to the prototype than the low distortions but was still within the same category of dot 
patterns as the prototype, low distortions, and other high distortions.   
In addition to the within category dot stimuli, 40 non-category dot patterns were created 
by making 40 high distortions of a completely different dot pattern using the same statistical 
principles as those that were used to make the within category dot patterns.  In total, the stimuli 
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consisted of a prototype, 20 low distortions, 60 high distortions, and 40 non-category stimuli 




      Low Distortion                        Prototype                                 High Distortion 
                                                     
                                                    Non-category 
 
Figure 6.  Examples of Experimental Stimuli for Experiment 2 
 
All stimuli were created in Excel following the procedure outlined above.  They were 
then converted into jpegs using SnagIt, a screen capture program.  Finally the stimuli were 
resized to ensure that they were all the same size and quality.  When projected, each dot was one-
centimeter in diameter and the entire stimulus subtended a visual angle of 32 x 26 degrees. 
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3.1.4 Procedure 
As with Experiment 1, each participant was familiarized with the eye-tracking equipment 
and seated in a chair approximately 152 cm from the rear projection screen.  During calibration, 
the participant was required to look at the calibration points on the screen in front of him.  The 
calibration procedure was repeated until it was successful.  Once the calibration was successfully 
completed, the participant was provided the following instructions: 
“This study involves dot patterns.  You will see dot patterns on the screen in front of you.  
The dot patterns will be on the screen for a few seconds and then will disappear.  Your job is to 
look at the dot patterns the whole time they are on the screen.  Do you have any questions?”  The 
experimenter answered any questions and then proceeded to present the familiarization trials.  
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that used by Kéri, Kálmán, et al. (2001).  
During the familiarization trials, participants were presented with 40 high distortions of the 
prototype.  These stimuli were presented in a random order and were on the screen for five 
seconds with an interstimulus interval of one second.  During the interstimulus interval, a 
grayscale striped gradient was presented in order to decrease the amount of afterimage that was 
created by the previously seen dot stimulus.  
Following the familiarization phase, there was a five minute break in which the 
participant was permitted to stand up and move around but otherwise did not engage in any other 
tasks.  After this delay period, the participant was reseated and recalibrated.  The participant was 
given a response pad with two buttons labeled “yes” and “no”.  The participant was then given 
the following instructions:  
“Now I am going to show you more dot patterns and your job is to decide if they look 
familiar to you, like you have seen them before.  Some dot patterns will look familiar to you (like 
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you have seen them before) and will look like they belong to the same group of dot patterns that 
you saw earlier.  Others will look like they belong to a group of dot patterns that you have never 
seen before.  I want you to press ‘yes’ if the dot pattern belongs to the group of dot patterns you 
saw earlier.  I want you to press ‘no’ if the dot pattern belongs to a different group of dot patterns 
that you have never seen before.  It is important for you to answer as quickly yet as accurately as 
possible.  If you are not sure of the answer, just make your best guess.  Now I am going to have 
you practice pressing the buttons.  Press the ‘yes’ button.  Now press the ‘no’ button.  Do you 
have any questions?”  The experimenter answered any questions and then proceeded to present 
the test trials.   
During the test trials, participants were presented with four instances of the prototype, 20 
low distortions of the prototype, 20 new high distortions of the prototype, and 40 non-category 
dot patterns in randomized order.  Each stimulus was presented until the participant responded 
by pressing a button on the response pad.  Participants responded using a response pad with two 
buttons labeled “yes” and “no”.  The left-right orientation of the labels was counterbalanced 
across participants.  During the entire procedure the participants eye movements were recorded 
in order to determine which part(s) of the dot patterns the participant looked at when viewing the 
familiarization patterns.  The participant’s responses were also recorded by Tobii Studio.   
3.1.5 Eye-tracking Preparation (AOIs) 
All familiarization stimuli were partitioned into areas of interest (AOIs) corresponding to 
each dot, the figure, and the whole stimulus.  Each Dot AOI was drawn as circle with a 15 mm 
diameter.  The AOI was placed so that the dot was in the exact center of the circle.  If two dots in 
a stimulus were in positions that would result in the Dot AOIs overlapping, one Dot AOI was 
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drawn that included both dots as part of that AOI.  When this occurred, the AOI was placed so 
that each dot was equally included in the AOI (see Figure 7).  The Figure AOI was drawn as a 
box that extended vertically and horizontally to include all nine dots.  The Stimulus AOI was 
drawn as a box that included the entire stimulus (background and dots).  Figure 7 shows an 
example of all AOIs.   
 
     
Figure 7.  Examples AOIs for Experiment 2 
 
3.2 RESULTS 
3.2.1 Percent Endorsed Data 
The first aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether individuals with autism, in 
contrast to typically developing individuals, experience difficulty abstracting prototypes of dot 
pattern information.  During the test phase, the participants were asked to identify whether the 
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presented dot patterns were members of the same category of dot patterns that they had seen 
during the familiarization phase or a different category of dot patterns that they had never seen 
before.  Individuals who successfully abstract a prototype and form a well-defined category of 
the dot patterns presented during the familiarization phase are expected to classify the previously 
unseen dot prototype as a category member more often than low distortions of the prototype 
which in turn should be classified as members more often than the high distortions of the 
prototype.  The non-category distortions are expected to be classified as category members the 
least often.  In order to address this aim, Percent Endorsed was the main dependent measure of 
interest.  This percentage provided a measure of how often the dot patterns were classified as 
members of the previously seen category.   
Percent Endorsed was calculated for each distortion level (Prototype, Low, High, Non-
category) by counting the number of “Yes” responses for that distortion level during the test 
trials, dividing that number by the total number of stimuli at that level (4 for Prototype, 20 for 
Low, 20 for High, and 40 for Non-category), and multiplying the result by 100.  A 2-way 
ANOVA was conducted on the Percent Endorsed data.  The between subjects variable was 
Group (Autism vs. Control) and the within subject variable was Distortion (Prototype vs. Low 
vs. High vs. Non-category).  Results indicated a significant main effect of Distortion, F (3, 114) 
= 85.30, p < .01.  Post-hoc comparisons (Holm-Bonferroni) resulted in significant differences 
between all Distortion levels with Percent Endorsed being highest for the Prototype dot patterns 
(M = 88.13%), second highest for the Low distortion dot patterns (M = 68.25%), third highest for 
the High distortion dot patterns (M = 58.63%) and least for the Non-category dot patterns (M = 
37.73%).  All comparisons were significant at the p < .01 level.  Results did not evidence a 
significant main effect of Group, F (1, 38) = 1.71, p = .20.  In general, the Control group (M = 
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64.94%) did not differ from the Autism group (M = 61.43%) in the mean Percent Endorsed 



























Figure 8.  Mean Percent Endorsed by Distortion Level (* p < .05) 
 
The Group X Distortion interaction was significant, F (3, 114) = 3.55, p < .05.   The 
Percent Endorsed data by distortion level is presented in Figure 8.  Post-hoc paired comparisons 
(Holm-Bonferroni) conducted separately for the Autism and Control groups resulted in 
significant differences between all Distortion levels for the Control group (p < .001) and Autism 
group (p < .05).  Therefore, there was a stronger pattern of Prototype > Low > High > Non-
category dot pattern Percent Endorsement for the Control group than the Autism group.   
Independent samples t-tests were performed on all distortion levels to determine whether 
there were any group differences in the Percent Endorsed data.  It can be seen in Figure 8 that the 
Autism (M = 56.75%) and Control (M = 60.50%) groups did not significantly differ in the 
percentage of High level distortions endorsed as category members, t = -.87, p = .39.  There was 
a marginally significant difference between the groups for both the Low distortion and Non-
*
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category stimuli.  The Control group (M = 72.00%) endorsed more Low distortions as category 
members than the Autism group (M = 64.50%), t = -1.72, p = .09.  In contrast, the Control group 
(M = 33.50%) endorsed fewer Non-category stimuli as category members than the Autism group 
(M = 41.95%), t = 1.74, p = .09.  The only significant result was that the Control group (M = 
93.75%) endorsed the Prototype stimuli as category members significantly more often than the 
Autism group (M = 82.50%), t = -2.07, p < .05.  Taken together, these results suggest that the 
Control group formed a more well-defined category and prototype of dot patterns than the 
Autism group during the familiarization phase as evidenced by including more category 
members (specifically Low distortions and Prototype dot patterns) in the learned category and 
excluding more Non-category dot patterns from the learned category.     
In order to further examine potential differences in the formation of the entire dot pattern 
category, a composite score (Total Percent Correct) was calculated for each participant that 
consisted of the average of the participant’s performance on all levels of distortion.  The Total 
Percent correct was calculated by averaging the Percent Endorsed scores for the Low distortions, 
High distortions, and Prototype dot patterns and the Percent Correct score (opposite of Percent 
Endorsed) for the Non-category dot patterns.  The Percent Correct score rather than Percent 
Endorsed score was used for the Non-category stimuli because a correct categorization of the 
Non-category stimuli resulted when the participant correctly excluded the Non-category dot 
pattern from the learned category.  An independent samples t-test indicated that the Control 
group (M = 73.19%) correctly categorized more dot patterns than the Autism Group (65.45%), t 
= -2.82, p < .01.  This result provides additional support for the notion that the Control group 
formed a more well-defined category of dot patterns than the Autism group during the 
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familiarization phase by including more category members in the learned category and excluding 
more Non-category dot patterns from the learned category.   
As with Experiment 1, while these analyses provide important information regarding 
between group differences in the Percent Endorsed data, they do not address potential differences 
in the range or distribution of scores between the two groups.  For instance, were there more 
participants in the Control group who showed clear evidence of dot prototype formation?  Were 
there more participants in the Autism group who showed clear evidence of a lack of dot 
prototype formation?   
Figure 9 presents the distribution of performance in the dot prototype task across groups 
as a frequency plot of the number of participants in each group who correctly endorsed one, two 
three, or four of the dot prototype stimuli as category members.  It can be seen that sixteen out of 
twenty participants in the Control group showed clear evidence of dot prototype formation by 
correctly endorsing the dot prototype stimuli in four out of four trials.  However, only ten 
participants in the Autism group showed clear evidence of dot prototype formation.  In contrast, 
one participant in the Control group and four participants in the Autism group showed clear 
evidence of a lack of prototype formation by correctly endorsing the dot prototype stimuli as 
category members in two or fewer trials.  Six participants in the Autism group and three 
participants in the Control group correctly endorsed the dot prototype stimuli as category 
members in three out of four trials.  Since correctly endorsing the dot prototype stimuli as 
category members in two out of four trials can be considered to be random or chance level 
performance, it is difficult to know whether endorsing the dot prototype stimuli as category 
members in three out of four trials is evidence of prototype formation or not.  A chi-square 
analysis comparing the distribution of clear prototype formers (n = 10 in the Autism group,         
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n = 16 in the Control group) and clear non-prototype formers (n = 4 in the Autism group, n = 1 in 
the Control group) revealed a marginally significant association between diagnosis and prototype 
formation, χ2(1) = 2.92, p = .09.  Based on the odds ratio, individuals in the Control group were 
6.40 times more likely to show clear evidence of prototype formation than were individuals in 
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Figure 9.  Distribution of Performance for the Prototype Stimuli across Groups 
 
3.2.2 D-prime (D’) Data 
One potential problem with the Percent Endorsed data is that participants who had a bias 
towards pressing “Yes” and endorsing stimuli as category members would have high Percent 
Endorsed scores on the Prototype, Low, and High distortions even if they did not abstract the 
prototype and category of the dot patterns during the familiarization phase.  In order to examine 
Percent Endorsed and control for response bias, D-prime (D’) scores were calculated for the 
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Prototype, Low distortion, and High distortion stimuli.  Higher D’ scores are indicative of better 
performance.   
Before calculating D’, the number of Hits, Misses, False Alarms, and Correct Rejections 
had to be calculated.  Hits (H) were defined as responses in which the participant correctly 
endorsed a Prototype, Low distortion, or High distortion dot pattern as a member of the 
previously seen category.  Misses (M) were defined as responses in which the participant 
incorrectly rejected a Prototype, Low distortion, or High distortion dot pattern as a member of 
the previously seen category.  False Alarms (FA) were defined as responses in which the 
participant incorrectly endorsed a Non-category dot pattern as a member of the previously seen 
category.  Correct Rejections (CR) were defined as responses in which the participant correctly 
rejected a Non-category dot pattern as a member of the previously seen category.  
 D’ was calculated separately for Prototype, Low distortion, and High Distortion dot  
patterns using the following formula: 
D’ = z (# H / (# H + # M)) – z (# FA / (# FA + # CR)) 
A 2-way ANOVA was conducted on the D’ data.  The between subjects variable was 
Group (Autism vs. Control) and the within subject variable was Distortion (Prototype vs. Low 
vs. High). The D’ data by distortion level is presented in Figure 10.  When response bias was 
controlled for, results indicated a significant main effect of Distortion, F (2, 76) = 80.27, p < 
.001.   Post-hoc comparisons (Holm-Bonferroni) resulted in significant differences between all 
Distortion levels with D’ being highest for the Prototype dot patterns (M = 2.77), second highest 
for the Low distortion dot patterns (M = .87), and the least for the High distortion dot patterns (M 
= .59).  All comparisons were significant at the p < .001 level.  Results also evidenced a 
significant main effect of Group, F (1, 38) = 8.21, p < .01.  In general, the Control group (M = 
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1.76) endorsed more Prototype, Low distortion, and High distortion dot patterns as category 























Figure 10.  D-prime by Distortion Level (* p < .05) 
 
The interaction was marginally significant, F (2, 76) = 2.93, p = .06.  Post-hoc 
comparisons (Holm-Bonferroni) conducted separately for the Autism and Control groups 
resulted in significant differences between all Distortion levels for the Control group (p < .001).  
All differences between Distortion levels were significant for the Autism group at the p < .01 
level except the difference between the Low and High distortion stimuli which was significant at 
the p < .05 level.   Therefore, there was again a stronger pattern of Prototype > Low > High D’ 
for the Control group than the Autism group.  
Independent samples t-tests were performed on all distortion levels to determine whether 
there were any group differences in the D’ data.  It can be seen in Figure 10 that when response 
bias was controlled for, the Control group (M = 3.38 and M = 1.12 and M = .79) endorsed 
significantly more Prototype, Low distortion and High distortion dot patterns as category 
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members than the Autism group (M = 2.16 and M = .62 and M = .40) (t = -2.40, p < .05  for 
Prototype dot patterns, t = -2.65, p < .05 for Low distortion dot patterns, and t = -2.38, p < .05 for 
High distortion dot patterns).  Therefore, once response bias was controlled for, the Control 
group showed significantly better performance for both Low and High distortions than the 
Autism group.  This indicates that the Autism group was more likely to have a response bias 
leading to only marginally significant results for the Percent Endorsed data for the Low and High 
distortions.  These results provide stronger evidence that the Control group formed a more well-
defined category of dot patterns during the familiarization phase than the Autism group. 
3.2.3 Relationship between Prototype Formation or Category Formation and Other 
Abilities 
The second aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether dot prototype (Percent 
Endorsed and D’ for the Prototype dot patterns) or category formation ability (D’ for Low and 
High distortions) is related to measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, or the 
social, communication, or behavioral symptoms of autism.  Correlations between measures of 
prototype and category formation and measures of intelligence (VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ), low-level 
perceptual processing (K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score), and the social, communication, and 
behavioral symptoms of autism (ADOS Social Interaction Total Score, ADOS Communication 
Total Score, ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total Score, and ADOS Stereotyped 
Behaviors and Restricted Interests Total Score) were calculated.  The correlations were 
calculated separately for the Autism group and the Control group since different variables may 
be related to performance in each group.  The correlations between performance on the dot 
prototype task and the other measures are presented in Table 8.   
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Table 8:  Correlations Between Dot Prototype Task Performance and Measures of 
Intelligence, Symptoms of Autism, and Low-level Perceptual Processing 
 
Prototype Percent Endorsed Autism    Control   
VIQ  .19 -.17 
PIQ .48* -.33 
FSIQ .57** -.29 
ADOS Social Interaction Total -.14  
ADOS Communication Total -.12  
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total -.15  
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total -.03  
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score .66** -.10 
 
Prototype D’ Autism   Control   
VIQ  .08 -.10 
PIQ .63*** -.40 
FSIQ .63*** -.31 
ADOS Social Interaction Total -.31  
ADOS Communication Total -.33  
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total -.36  
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total -.03  












Low Distortion D’ Autism   Control   
VIQ  -.01 -.26 
PIQ .37 -.26 
FSIQ .34 -.28 
ADOS Social Interaction Total -.40*  
ADOS Communication Total -.43*  
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total -.47**  
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total -.02  











High Distortion D’ Autism   Control    
VIQ  .08 -.37 
PIQ .37 -.23 
FSIQ .42* -.31 
ADOS Social Interaction Total -.29  
ADOS Communication Total -.43*  
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total -.41*  
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total -.29  
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score .32 -.25 
*** p < .01 
**   p < .05 
*    p < .08 
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It can be seen that in the Autism group, the Percent Endorsed score and the D’ for the 
Prototype dot patterns was positively related to PIQ (r = .48, p < .05; r = 63, p < .01), FSIQ (r = 
.57, p < .01; r = .63, p < .01), and the K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score (r = .66, p < .01; r = .72, 
p < .01).  These correlations suggest that in the Autism group, individuals who were able to form 
a prototype of the dot patterns had higher IQs and better perceptual abilities than those who were 
unable to form a prototype of dot pattern information.  They also suggest that individuals with 
autism who were able to form a dot pattern prototype evidenced a greater ability to engage in 
global processing or had less of a local processing bias than those who were unable to form a 
prototype of dot pattern information.  
Regarding category formation ability, D’ scores for the Low distortions were 
significantly correlated with the ADOS Social Interaction and Communication score in the 
Autism group, r = -.47, p < .05.  The correlation for the High distortions was marginally 
significant, r = .41, p = .07.  This suggests that individuals with autism who were more 
successful in correctly endorsing Low and High distortion dot patterns as category members had 
fewer social and communication deficits.  None of the correlations reached significance for the 
Control group. 
 
3.2.4 Eye-tracking Results 
The third aim of Experiment 2 was to use eye-tracking technology to investigate what 
areas of the stimulus and/or dot pattern typically developing individuals and individuals with 
autism attend to or look at when forming a prototype of dot patterns.  Of the 20 individuals with 
autism and 20 control individuals, 15 individuals in each group were included in the eye-tracking 
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analyses.  Five participants in each group were excluded due to poor eye-tracking data (e.g., poor 
calibration or lack of accurate eye-tracking).  As with the full participant set, no significant 
differences were found between the two groups on age, FSIQ, VIQ, or PIQ.   
Of interest was whether the Autism and Control groups differed in the mean number of 
dots that were fixated upon or the proportion of time that they spent looking at the dot patterns 
(% LT) during the familiarization trials.  Differences in these measures could provide important 
information about why the Autism group performed more poorly on the dot prototype task.  For 
example, if the Autism group spent less time looking at the dot patterns and more time looking at 
the background, they would be less likely to form a prototype or dot pattern category during the 
familiarization phase.  Similarly, if the Autism Group engaged in localized processing involving 
focusing on or looking at fewer dots, they may be less likely to form a prototype of the entire dot 
pattern. 
 As stated above, it was important to determine whether the Autism and Control groups 
differed in the amount of time that they spent looking at the Figure AOI (dot pattern) vs. the 
Stimulus AOI (dot pattern and background).  The dependent measure of interest was the % LT 
for the Figure AOI (% Figure).  To calculate the % LT, the observation length or the total 
amount of time spent looking at each AOI (i.e., Figure and Stimulus) was summed across all of 
the familiarization trials.  The % Figure was then calculated by dividing the total amount of time 
the participant spent looking at the Figure by the total amount of time spent looking at the 
Stimulus and multiplying the result by 100.  An independent samples t-test determined that the 
Autism group (M = 98.71%) and Control group (M = 99.60%) did not differ in the percentage of 
time that they spent looking at the dot patterns, t = -1.65, p = .11.  Therefore, the difference 
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between the Autism group and Control group in prototype formation ability was not due to a 
differential amount of time spent looking at the dot patterns. 
To address whether the groups differed in the number of dots that were fixated upon 
during the familiarization trials, the dependent measure of interest was the mean percentage of 
dots fixated upon (% Dots).  The % Dots was used as the dependent measure rather than the 
number of dots, because some dot patterns had fewer than nine dot AOIs due to the location of 
the dots in the dot pattern (see the Methods section for a review of the AOI definitions).  An 
independent samples t-test determined that the Autism group (M = 28.99%) and Control group 
(M = 26.02%) did not differ in the percentage of dots that they fixated upon during the 
familiarization trials, t = .57, p = .57.  In fact, neither group directly looked at more than two to 
three out of nine dots on average.  This result indicates that both groups focused on only a few 
dots on average when viewing the familiarization trials.  Therefore, the difference between the 
Autism and Control groups in prototype formation ability was also not due to differences in the 
number of dots that were directly fixated upon during the familiarization trials.  
3.2.5 Subset Analyses 
The final aim of Experiment 2 was to examine individual differences in the ability to 
abstract prototypes.   More specifically, it was aimed to determine whether there was a subset of 
individuals with autism who were able to successfully form a dot pattern prototype.  Of 
particular interest is whether individuals with autism who were able to successfully form a dot 
pattern prototype differed from those who performed poorly on the dot prototype task on 
measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual processing, symptoms of autism, or eye-tracking 
measures.   
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To this end, the 20 participants with autism were grouped into two subgroups, prototype 
formers and non-prototype formers.  Prototype formers were defined as individuals who 
endorsed the prototype as a category member in three or more of the four test trials (n = 16 for 
most measures, n = 11 for eye-tracking measures).  Non-prototype formers were defined as 
individuals who endorsed the prototype as a category member in two or fewer test trials (n = 4).  
The means and standard deviations for the measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, symptoms of autism, and eye-tracking for the prototype formers and non-prototype 
formers are presented in Table 9.  Due to the small sample size for the non-prototype formers, 
formal statistical tests could not be performed on this data.   
 
Table 9:  Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Intelligence, Symptoms of 
Autism, Low-level Perceptual Processing, and Eye-tracking for Prototype Formers and 







Formers         
(n = 16)         
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 4) 
M (SD) 
VIQ 109.81 (9.50) 103.50 (10.88) 
PIQ  111.62 (12.90) 107.00 (10.95) 
FSIQ  111.75 (7.36) 105.75 (7.93) 
ADOS Social Interaction Total 9.00 (1.59) 8.75 (.50) 
ADOS Communication Total 5.31 (1.14) 5.00 (1.41) 
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total 14.31 (1.83) 13.75 (1.89) 
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total 2.19 (1.58) 2.75 (.96) 
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score  59.13 (8.07) 51.50 (8.35) 
 Prototype 
Formers         
(n = 11)         
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 4) 
M (SD) 
% Figure 98.95 (1.96) 98.06 (2.26) 




As can be seen in Table 9, the differences between the two groups using these criteria 
were quite small.  Similar to the Experiment 1, a limitation of using the criteria of three out of 
four trials is that, since choosing the prototype as a category member in two out of four trials can 
be considered to be random or chance level performance, it is difficult to know whether choosing 
the prototype as a category member in three out of four trials is evidence of prototype formation 
or not.  Therefore, a second set of subgroups were formed using a more stringent definition of 
prototype former.  For these subgroups, prototype formers were defined as individuals who 
endorsed the prototype as a category member in all test trials (four out of four or 100%).  Non-
prototype formers were defined the same way as in the first set of subgroups.  Individuals who 
endorsed the prototype as a category member in three out of four trials were excluded from these 
subgroups. 
The means and standard deviations for the measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, symptoms of autism, and eye-tracking for the prototype formers (n = 10 for most 
measures, n = 8 for eye-tracking measures) and non-prototype formers (n = 4) using a more 
stringent classification criteria are presented in Table 10.  Again, due to the small sample size for 
the non-prototype formers, formal statistical tests could not be performed on this data.  However, 
an examination of the group means indicated that the prototype formers had higher FSIQ (M = 
115.30) and PIQ (M = 118.30) scores than non-prototype formers (FSIQ M = 105.75; PIQ M = 
107.00).  These results parallel the correlational results and suggest that individuals with autism 
who were able to form a prototype of the dot patterns had better perceptual abilities and higher 
IQ scores than those who were unable to form a prototype of dot pattern information.  Prototype 
formers (M = 63.70) also had a higher K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-scores than non-prototype 
formers (M = 51.50).  These results also parallel the correlational results and suggest that 
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individuals with autism who were able to form a dot pattern prototype evidenced a greater ability 
to engage in global processing or had less of a local processing bias than those who were unable 
to form a prototype of dot pattern information.   
 
Table 10:  Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Intelligence, Symptoms of 
Autism, Low-level Perceptual Processing, and Eye-tracking for Prototype Formers and 







Formers         
(n = 10)         
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 4) 
M (SD) 
VIQ 109.30 (7.70) 103.50 (10.88) 
PIQ  118.30 (7.66) 107.00 (10.95) 
FSIQ  115.30 (6.55) 105.75 (7.93) 
ADOS Social Interaction Total 8.60 (1.35) 8.75 (.50) 
ADOS Communication Total 4.90 (.88) 5.00 (1.41) 
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total 13.50 (1.65) 13.75 (1.89) 
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total 2.40 (1.58) 2.75 (.96) 
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score  63.70 (4.57) 51.50 (8.35) 
 Prototype 
Formers         
(n = 8)          
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 4) 
M (SD) 
% Figure 98.61 (2.24) 98.06 (2.26) 
% Dots 28.95 (16.11) 23.71 (10.13) 
 
** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
 
One remaining question is whether individuals with autism who were able to form a 
prototype of the dot patterns also formed more well-defined categories of dot patterns.  In other 
words, did the prototype formers endorse more High and Low distortions as category members 
and exclude more Non-category stimuli as category members of the learned dot pattern category.  
To address this question, individuals with autism were again divided into subgroups using the 
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stringent definition of prototype former (i.e., 100% prototype stimuli endorsed as category 
members).  All other individuals with autism were considered to be non-prototype formers.  
These definitions resulted in larger subgroups and allowed for formal statistical analyses.   
Table 11 shows the means and standard deviations for the measures of intelligence, low-
level perceptual processing, and symptoms of autism for prototype formers and non-prototype 
formers using these criteria.  Independent samples t-tests produced similar results as the previous 
analyses with prototype formers having significantly higher FSIQs, PIQs, and K-SNAP Gestalt 
Closure T-Scores than non-prototype formers.  However, these results were more significant due 
to increased sample sizes and power (t = 3.49, p < .01 for FSIQ; t = 3.43, p < .01 for PIQ; t = 
4.62, p < .001 for K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score).   
 
Table 11:  Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Intelligence, Symptoms of 
Autism, and Low-level Perceptual Processing for Prototype Formers and Non-prototype 
Formers for the Dot Prototype Experiment using Stringent Criteria (All Participants) 
 
Variable Prototype 
Formers         
(n = 10)         
M (SD) 
Non-prototype 
Formers        
(n = 10) 
M (SD) 
VIQ 109.30 (7.70) 107.80 (11.98) 
PIQ * 118.30 (7.66) 103.10 (11.75) 
FSIQ * 115.30 (6.55) 105.80 (5.57) 
ADOS Social Interaction Total 8.60 (1.35) 9.30 (1.49) 
ADOS Communication Total 4.90 (.88) 5.60 (1.35) 
ADOS Social Interaction and Communication Total 13.50 (1.65) 14.90 (2.73) 
ADOS Restricted Behavior and Stereotyped Interests Total 2.40 (1.58) 2.20 (1.87) 
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Score ** 63.70 (4.57) 51.50 (7.00) 
 
** p < .001 




The Percent Endorsed and D’ data for prototype formers and non-prototype formers is 
presented in Figures 11 and 12.  The Control group data is also included in the figures as a 
comparison.  Independent samples t-tests resulted in marginally significant differences between 
the groups in the Percent Endorsed data for Low distortions and Non-category members.  
Prototype formers (M = 70.00%) endorsed more Low distortions as category members than non-
prototype formers (M = 59.00%), t = 1.71, p = .11.  Prototype formers (M = 36.25%) also 
endorsed fewer Non-category members as members of the learned category than non-prototype 
formers (M = 47.65%), t = -1.98, p = .06.  However, when response bias was controlled for (i.e., 
D’ data), prototype formers (M = .94) endorsed significantly more Low distortions as category 
members than non-prototype formers (M = .30), t = 2.43, p < .05.  The results for the High 
distortions was only marginally significant with prototype formers (M = .59) endorsing 
significantly more High distortions as category members than non-prototype formers (M = .21), t 


























Figure 11.  Mean Percent Endorsed by Distortion Level for Prototype Formers and 




















Figure 12.  D-prime by Distortion Level for Prototype Formers and Non-prototype 
Formers with the Control Group as a Comparison   (* p < .05) 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that within the Autism group, when individuals with 
autism were able to form a prototype of dot patterns, they also formed a significantly more well-
defined category of dot patterns.  This result was evidenced by including more Low and High 
distortions in the learned category and excluding more Non-category members from the 
category.  In fact, independent samples t-tests indicated that even though their scores were 
somewhat lower, the data for the prototype formers was not significantly different from the 
control data for Percent Endorsed or D’ for any level of distortion.  Therefore, there was a 
subgroup of ten individuals with autism (half of the participants) who were able to successfully 
form a prototype and category of dot pattern information.  As stated above, these individuals had 
higher IQs, better perceptual abilities, and may have had a greater ability to engage in global 
processing or may have had less of a local processing bias than those who were unable to form a 
prototype of dot pattern information.  It is important to note that even though half of the 
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individuals with autism (10 out of 20) were able to abstract the dot pattern prototype, almost all 
of the participants in the Control group (16 out of 20) were able to do so successfully.   
3.3 DISCUSSION 
The first aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether individuals with autism, in 
contrast to typically developing individuals, experience difficulty abstracting prototypes of dot 
pattern information.  Results indicated that across both groups, participants showed a pattern of 
results where the percent of dot patterns endorsed as category members was highest for the 
Prototype dot patterns (M = 88.13%), second highest for the Low distortion dot patterns (M = 
68.25%), third highest for the High distortion dot patterns (M = 58.63%) and least for the Non-
category dot patterns (M = 37.73%).  As was hypothesized, the Control group results paralleled 
those from Kéri, Kálmán, et al. (2001) in that the they correctly categorized the Prototype dot 
patterns more often than the Low distortions which were in turn correctly categorized more often 
than the High distortions.  The Non-category dot patterns were endorsed as members of the 
learned category the least often.   
This pattern of endorsement was also evident in the Autism group, but to a lesser extent.  
Even so, there was a significant difference between all levels of distortion for the Autism group.  
The only between group difference that emerged was for the Prototype stimuli indicating that the 
Control group correctly endorsed the Prototype stimuli as category members more often than the 
Autism group.  In fact, sixteen out of twenty participants in the Control group showed clear 
evidence of dot prototype formation by correctly endorsing the dot prototype stimuli as category 
members in four out of four trials while only ten participants in the Autism group showed clear 
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evidence of dot prototype formation.  There were also marginally significant differences in the 
Percent Endorsed for the Low distortions and Non-category members with the Autism group 
correctly endorsing fewer Low distortions and incorrectly endorsing more Non-category 
members than the Control group.  However, when response bias was controlled for using D’, the 
Autism group showed significantly poorer performance for the Prototype dot patterns, Low 
distortion, and High distortions than the Control group.   
Taken together, the results suggest that the Control group formed a more well-defined 
category and prototype of dot patterns than the Autism group during the familiarization phase of 
the experiment by including more category members in the learned category and excluding more 
non-category patterns from the learned category.  In contrast, the Autism group evidenced 
“fuzzier boundaries” and included more non-category patterns into the learned category.   
Therefore, the second hypothesis was partially supported and the third hypothesis was supported 
in that even though the participants in the Autism group showed the same pattern of results as the 
Control group, they evidenced more difficulty with correctly categorizing all levels of distortion 
when response bias was taken into account.   
While no specific hypotheses were made, the second aim was to determine whether dot 
prototype formation ability was related to measures of intelligence, low-level perceptual 
processing, or the social, communication, or behavioral symptoms of autism.  As with 
Experiment 1, none of the correlations reached significance for the Control group indicating that 
performance on the dot prototype task was not related to intelligence or low-level perceptual 
processing.  The Percent Endorsed and D’ scores for the Prototype dot patterns were positively 
related to FSIQ, PIQ, and the K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Scores in the Autism group.  These 
correlations suggest that individuals with autism who were able to form a prototype of the dot 
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patterns had higher IQ scores and better perceptual abilities.  These individuals may have also 
had stronger global processing skills, less “weak central coherence”, or less of a local processing 
bias than those who were unable to form a prototype of dot pattern information.  Regarding 
category formation ability, correlations between D’ scores and the ADOS Social Interaction and 
Communication score was significant for Low distortions and marginally significant for High 
distortions.  These results suggest that individuals with autism who were more successful in 
correctly endorsing Low and High distortion dot patterns as category members had fewer social 
and communication deficits.   Potential significance of these results will be discussed in detail in 
the General Discussion.   
The third aim was to use eye-tracking technology to investigate what areas of the 
stimulus and/or dot pattern typically developing individuals and individuals with autism attend to 
or look at when forming a prototype of dot patterns.  Eye-tracking data was collected during the 
familiarization trials in order to address why the Autism group performed more poorly on the dot 
prototype task.  Differences in the mean number of dots that were fixated upon or the proportion 
of time that the participants spent looking at the dot patterns during the familiarization trials may 
provide potential explanations for these results.  For example, if the Autism group spent less time 
looking at the dot patterns and more time looking at the background, they would be less likely to 
form a prototype or dot pattern category during the familiarization phase.  Similarly, if the 
Autism Group engaged in localized processing involving focusing on or looking at fewer dots, 
they may be less likely to form a prototype of the entire dot pattern.   
Examination of eye fixation patterns indicated that, as hypothesized, the Autism and 
Control groups did not differ in the amount of time spent looking at the dot patterns.  Therefore, 
the difference between the Autism group and Control group in prototype formation ability was 
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not due to a differential amount of time spent looking at the dot patterns during the 
familiarization trials.  It was hypothesized that the participants in the Control group would look 
at all or most of the dots in the dot patterns during the familiarization phase while the 
participants in the Autism group would look at fewer dots in the dot patterns.  These hypotheses 
were not supported in that both groups looked at approximately two to three of the nine dots on 
average.  Therefore, the difference between the Autism and Control groups in dot prototype 
formation ability was not due to differences in the number of dots that were directly fixated upon 
during the familiarization trials.   
The final aim was to examine individual differences in the ability to abstract prototypes 
in individuals with autism.  A closer examination of individual participant’s data in the Autism 
group indicated that there was a subset of individuals with autism who were able to form a 
prototype of dot pattern information.  A generous definition of prototype former (correctly 
endorsed the prototype dot patterns as category members in three or four out of four trials) 
identified sixteen individuals with autism who performed well on the dot prototype task while a 
stringent definition of prototype former (correctly endorsed the prototype dot patterns as 
category members in four out of four trials) identified ten individuals with autism with intact dot 
prototype formation abilities.  An important question is whether individuals with autism who 
were able to form a prototype of dot pattern information differed from those who were unable to 
do so successfully.  Results indicated that the individuals with autism who performed best on the 
dot prototype formation task had higher FSIQ, PIQ, and K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-scores than 
those who performed poorly on the dot prototype task.  These results parallel the correlational 
results and suggest that individuals with autism who were able to form a prototype of the dot 
patterns had higher IQs and better perceptual abilities.  These individuals may have also had 
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stronger global processing skills, less “weak central coherence”, or less of a local processing bias 
than those who were unable to form a prototype of dot pattern information.  As with the 
correlational results, potential significance of these results will be discussed in the General 
Discussion. 
Another question was whether individuals with autism who were able to form a prototype 
of the dot patterns also formed more well-defined categories of dot patterns.  It was found that 
individuals with autism who formed the prototype did form a significantly more well-defined 
category of dot patterns as was evidenced by including more Low and High distortions in the 
learned category and excluding more Non-category members from the category.  In fact, even 
though their scores were somewhat lower, individuals with autism who were prototype formers 
did not significantly differ from the Control group on Percent Endorsed or D’ for any level of 
distortion.  Thus, there was a subgroup of ten individuals with autism (half of the participants) 
who were able to successfully form a prototype and category of dot pattern information.  As 
stated above, these individuals had higher IQs, better perceptual abilities, and may have had a 
greater ability to engage in global processing or may have had less of a local processing bias than 
those who were unable to form a prototype of dot pattern information.  It is important to note that 
even though half of the individuals with autism (10 out of 20) were able to abstract the dot 
pattern prototype, almost all of the participants in the Control group (16 out of 20) were able to 
do so successfully.  Therefore, even though a subgroup of individuals with autism performed 
well on the dot prototype task, there were significantly fewer than in the Control group.   
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4.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This study was the first to examine prototype formation abilities in individuals with 
autism with both social and non social stimuli.  Regarding the social stimuli, it was the first to 
use natural faces to study prototype formation.  This is important because natural faces provide a 
close replication of the facial information that is abstracted in real life.  For the non-social 
stimuli, this study was the first to use dot patterns, an artificial category that has been widely 
used to study prototype formation in a variety of populations from infants (Bomba & Siqueland, 
1983; Younger & Gotlieb, 1988) to adults with Alzheimer’s disease (Kéri, Kálmán, et al., 2001) 
or schizophrenia (Kéri, Kelemen, et al., 2001).  Since the general population does not have prior 
experience with dot patterns, using dot patterns to study prototype formation allows one to study 
the pure process of prototype formation without possible confounds of stimulus experience.   
A unique aspect of this study is that it was the first to use eye-tracking technology to 
provide information about what individuals with autism are looking at when forming prototypes 
or categories of social and non-social information.  Another unique aspect of this study was that 
performance on the face and dot prototype studies were studied in association with measures of 
intelligence, symptoms of autism, and low-level perceptual skills.  As a result, the study was able 
to address both if individual with autism have deficits in prototype formation and why they may 
have these deficits.  This study was also one of few studies to take into account the variability in 
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performance in individuals with autism and examine individual and subgroup differences in 
performance on the prototype formation tasks.   
The results indicated that individuals with autism had difficulty forming prototypes of 
both faces and dot patterns.  Interestingly, the individuals with autism had more difficulty with 
the face prototype task than the dot prototype task.  The dot prototype study also provided 
evidence that the individuals with autism had “fuzzy category boundaries.”  In other words, they 
incorrectly excluded more members from the learned category and incorrectly included more 
non-members into the learned category.  In the face prototype study, poor performance was 
found to be related to a higher number of stereotyped behaviors and restricted interests, while in 
the dot prototype study, poor performance was found to be related to lower IQs, worse 
perceptual skills, and more social and communication deficits.  Eye-tracking data did not reveal 
any between group differences in the amount of time spent looking at the faces or dot patterns 
during the familiarization trials.   
The remainder of this paper will relate the results of the current study to the previous 
literature on prototype formation and categorization and describe consistencies and 
inconsistencies with previous results.  Possible explanations for the difficulties that the 
individuals with autism had with prototype and category formation in addition to possible 
explanations for success on the face and dot prototype studies in a subgroup of individuals with 
autism will then be discussed.  Following these explanations, limitations of the current study and 
future research directions will be suggested.   
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4.1 PROTOTYPE AND CATEGORY FORMATION 
Prior studies on prototype formation and categorization in individuals with autism have 
had mixed results with some researchers finding a deficit or differences in prototype formation  
and/or categorization (Gastgeb et al., 2006, 2009; Klinger & Dawson, 1995, 2001; Klinger et al., 
2006; Plaisted, 2000) and others concluding that prototype formation and/or categorization is 
intact (Molesworth et al., 2005, 2008).   It has been shown that while individuals with autism can 
successfully categorize on the basis of simple definitive features when the task involves simple 
and typical objects, they have difficulty categorizing when categorization is based on more 
complex/less perceptually apparent features or involves less typical objects (Gastgeb et al., 2006; 
Klinger & Dawson, 1995; Plaisted, 2000).   
It has been argued that the “intact prototype formation” results found by Molesworth et 
al. (2005, 2008) may be due to participant variables (inclusion of high-functioning individuals 
with autism and Asperger’s disorder in the studies) or methodological variables (lack of subtle 
quantitative variations in features) (Gastgeb et al., 2009).  In other words, the autism group may 
not have formed a prototype but may have shown good performance by memorizing the values 
of the features that varied or focusing on one feature and basing their decisions on the variation 
in that feature rather than the entire stimulus.  The current study improved upon prior studies by 
including only high-functioning adults with autism and using more subtle, quantitative spatial 
variations when designing the face and dot pattern stimuli.  Another strength of the current study 
was that the mean prototype values for the faces and prototype stimuli for the dots were never 
seen by the participants during the familiarization phase.  Therefore, memorization of facial 
features or dot patterns was unlikely to falsely improve performance during the test phase.   
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The results of the face prototype experiment are consistent with and closely parallel 
Gastgeb et al.’s (2009) prior study on face prototype formation using line drawings of faces.  In 
fact, the mean prototype scores for the Control (M = 72.5%) and Autism groups (M = 50.83%) 
for the Wide condition in the current study were very similar to the percentages of adults in the 
Control (78%) and Autism groups (55%) who chose the prototype as more familiar than the 
modal face in the 2009 study.  The percentages are slightly lower in the current study, but this is 
likely due to the larger number of test trials or the use of natural faces that include more subtle 
quantitative variation rather than line drawings.  These differences made prototype formation in 
the current study slightly more difficult than in previous studies.  The lack of group differences 
in the Narrow condition highlights the role that subtlety of the quantitative spatial variation of 
the features plays in the ability to form a prototype.  It is possible that the differences in the 
spatial variations in the Narrow condition were too subtle and were indistinguishable to all 
participants.  
The results of the dot prototype experiment for the Control group are consistent with 
previous research by Keri and colleagues and led to a similar pattern of results with the Prototype 
stimuli being correctly endorsed as category members most often, Low distortions second, High 
distortions third, and Non-category members the least often (Kéri et al., 1999; Kéri, Kálmán, et 
al., 2001; Kéri, Kelemen, et al., 2001).  In contrast, the results for the Autism group revealed 
poorer prototype formation abilities and weaker category structures thus supporting the previous 
findings of Klinger and Dawson (2001), Klinger et al. (2006), and Plaisted (2000) indicating a 
deficit in prototype formation of non-face information (e.g., animal-like stimuli) in individuals 
with autism.   
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The results, however, contradict prior research by Molesworth et al. (2005, 2008) that 
found intact prototype formation abilities in individuals with autism.  It is likely that the 
methodological differences between the current study and Molesworth’s studies, especially the 
use of more complex quantitative spatial variation in the current study that cannot be categorized 
or abstracting by using simple rules or by focusing on one feature, led to these differences in 
results.   
The results from the dot prototype study also extended previous findings in gender and 
object categorization indicating that individuals with autism have “fuzzy category boundaries” 
and have difficulty categorizing less typical members of natural object and gender categories  
and extended these results to artificial categories such as dot patterns (Gastgeb et al., 2006; 
Strauss et al., in submission).  In comparison to the Control group, individuals with autism 
included more Non-category dot patterns into the learned category and excluded more Low and 
High distortion dot patterns from the learned category.   
4.2 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DIFFICULTIES WITH PROTOTYPE AND 
CATEGORY FORMATION IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
In addition to determining whether individuals with autism have a deficit in prototype 
and category formation, it is important to determine why individuals with autism have difficulty 
with prototype and category formation.  The results of Experiment 1 could be explained as a 
generalized difficulty in processing faces, since it is well known that individuals with autism 
have deficits in face recognition, gender categorization, and emotion recognition (e.g., Behrmann 
et al., 2006; Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2010; Best, Strauss, Newell, & Minshew, in prep; Celani, 
Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004; Klin, Sparrow, de 
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Bildt, Cicchetti, Cohen, & Volkmar, 1999; Lahaie, Mottron, Arguin, Berthiaume, Jemel, & 
Saumier, 2006; Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009).  However, since the results of 
Experiment 2 demonstrated prototype formation and categorization difficulties with non-facial 
stimuli, more general explanations need to be explored.  
One possibility is that individuals with autism do not pay sufficient attention to stimuli 
despite whether they are faces or objects.  However, the eye-tracking data suggests that this is 
not the case.  For both studies, the individuals with autism did not differ from the Control group 
in the percentage of time they spent looking at the stimuli in general or to the relevant features.  
Therefore, prototype formation and categorization difficulties cannot be accounted for by an 
overall lack of attention to the stimuli or the relevant information.   
Even though there were no overall differences in attention to the stimuli, there were some 
interesting differences in the way in which the individuals with autism distributed their attention 
to the facial information during the familiarization phase.  Despite the fact that the individuals 
with autism spent more time looking at the eyes than any other feature of the face, they spent less 
time looking at the eyes and more time looking at the mouths than the Control group.  These 
results are consistent with other eye-tracking studies that suggest individuals with autism devote 
less attention to the eye region than do control individuals (e.g., Klin et al., 2002; Norbury et al., 
2009; Pelphrey et al., 2002).  However, the general pattern of attention to the faces for both 
groups was similar suggesting that differential attention to features does not explain the difficulty 
that the individuals with autism had in the abstraction of facial prototypes.  Similarly, the eye-
tracking results from the dot pattern study revealed common attentional patterns between the two 
groups.  Therefore, prototype formation and categorization difficulties cannot be accounted for 
by differential attention to features or different attentional patterns to the stimuli. 
 89 
Difficulties in prototype formation and categorization in individuals with autism may also 
be related to differences in the way in which individuals with autism cognitively process 
information.  Two theories that address potential differences in perceptual processing are weak 
central coherence (Frith & Happé, 1994) and enhanced perceptual functioning (Mottron et al., 
2006).  According to the weak central coherence theory, individuals with autism lack the 
tendency to draw together diverse information to construct higher level meaning within context, 
prefer parts over wholes, have a local processing bias, and focus on details (Frith & Happé, 
1994).  It is thought that this type of processing is the automatic spontaneous processing style of 
individuals with autism.  The enhanced perceptual functioning theory differs from the weak 
central coherence theory in that it posits that individuals with autism prefer local processing but 
have the ability to process items globally when required to do so (Mottron et al., 2006).  If 
individuals with autism show weak central coherence or enhanced perceptual functioning, this 
would likely affect their ability to form a prototype or categorize information.  
The correlations between performance on the face and dot prototype tasks and measures 
of intelligence, symptoms of autism, and low-level perceptual processing in the individuals with 
autism provide some support for these explanations.  Individuals with autism who showed 
evidence of a lack of prototype formation on the face prototype task had lower scores on the     
K-SNAP Gestalt Closure task than those who performed well on the face prototype task.  On the 
dot prototype task, individuals with autism who had lower Percent Endorsed and D’ scores for 
the Prototype dot patterns had lower PIQs and K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Scores than those who 
had higher scores.  This suggests that individuals with autism who performed poorly on the face 
and dot prototype tasks may have had weaker global processing skills, weaker central coherence, 
more of a local processing bias, and/or weaker general perceptual processing abilities than those 
 90 
who were able to perform the tasks successfully which may have negatively affected their ability 
to form a prototype of facial and dot pattern information. 
Individuals with autism who showed evidence of a lack of prototype formation on the 
face prototype formation task also had more restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests as 
measured by the ADOS than those who performed well on the face prototype task.  This 
correlation suggests that perhaps individuals with autism who tend to focus intensely on details, 
parts or irrelevant aspects of objects, or topics of interest may be more likely to focus on specific 
aspects of the face rather than the whole face which would negatively affect prototype formation.   
The correlational data also revealed some interesting relationships between the social and 
communication symptoms of autism and performance on the dot prototype task.  Individuals 
with autism who had lower D’ scores and poorer categorization ability (e.g., fuzzier category 
boundaries) had more social and communication deficits as measured by the ADOS.  While 
these relationships are intriguing, they require further investigation before any strong conclusions 
can be made.  The ability to efficiently categorize and reduce information by forming central 
representations such as prototypes is critically important in that it reduces demands on memory 
and underlies important abilities such as face perception, object categorization, and language.  
While the current study addresses difficulties with perceptual categories, it is possible that these 
difficulties with prototype and category formation extend beyond perceptual categories to 
abstract and social categories such as friendship or love.  Due to the role that prototype formation 
and categorization have in the understanding and development of language, it is also possible 
that these difficulties affect the communication abilities of individuals with autism and their 
understanding of language.  Therefore, future research should investigate whether the deficits 
that were found with perceptual categories in the current study extend to the formation of 
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abstract and social concepts and understanding and production of language that may be reflected 
in the ADOS social and communication scores. 
Due to the nature of correlations, it is not possible to determine the causality between 
these variables; however, it is possible that an early deficit in categorization or prototype 
formation may lead to difficulties in socialization and communication.  An early deficit in the 
mechanisms used to form prototypes would result in infants having difficulty decreasing the 
amount of information in a complex environment and easily becoming overstimulated by sensory 
information.  Given the complexity of social information, infants may find it more adaptive to 
tune out social information rather than pay attention to it.  Future research on infant siblings of 
children with autism could address this possibility by studying prototype formation and 
categorization in these younger populations and determining whether infant siblings of children 
with autism who evidence difficulties with prototype formation or categorization are more likely 
to have social and communication deficits at a later age.   
4.3 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR SUCCESS WITH PROTOTYPE AND 
CATEGORY FORMATION IN A SUBGROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
One possible explanation for mixed results in the literature on prototype formation is the 
heterogenous nature of the strengths, deficits, and ability levels of individuals with autism.  By 
examining only group differences, researchers may conclude that individuals with autism do or 
do not have deficits in certain skills but may be missing important subgroup or individual level 
differences.  Even though there was an overall group level deficit in prototype formation in the 
individuals with autism in the current study, examining performance at the individual subject 
level identified a subgroup of individuals with autism who appeared to have intact prototype and 
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category formation abilities.  This was especially true in the dot prototype study in which a 
subgroup of ten individuals with autism performed similarly to the control group.  In the face 
prototype study, only three individuals with autism appeared to abstract a prototype of face 
information. 
Similar to the potential explanations for the deficits in prototype formation and 
categorization in individuals with autism, successful performance on the prototype tasks may 
also be explained by the correlations between measures of intelligence, symptoms of autism, and 
low-level perceptual processing.  Individuals with autism who appeared to show evidence of 
prototype formation on the face prototype task had higher scores on the K-SNAP Gestalt Closure 
task than those who performed poorly on that task.  On the dot prototype task, individuals with 
autism who had higher Percent Endorsed and D’ scores for the Prototype dot patterns had higher 
PIQs, FSIQs, and K-SNAP Gestalt Closure T-Scores than those who had lower scores.  These 
results suggest that individuals with autism who performed well on the face and dot prototype 
tasks may have had stronger global processing skills, less weaker central coherence, less of a 
local processing bias, and/or stronger general perceptual abilities than those who were able to 
perform the tasks successfully which may have positively affected their ability to perform well 
on the prototype tasks.  Therefore, it is possible that some individuals with autism do indeed 
have intact prototype formation skills leading to better performance on the prototype tasks.   
However, it is also possible that the individuals with autism who performed well on the 
prototype tasks did not actually abstract a prototype of the face or dot pattern information but 
instead discovered an alternative strategy to succeed on these tasks.  For example, for the dot 
prototype task, the individuals with autism may have focused on certain subsets of dots or 
relational patterns rather than focusing on and abstracting a prototype of the entire dot pattern.  
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Since the spatial variation of the placement of the dots in the dot patterns had constraints based 
on probabilities, the dots tended to be in the same general area from one dot pattern to the next.  
Therefore, successful performance could have resulted from identifying and/or focusing on a 
subset pattern of dots rather than forming an overall dot pattern prototype.   
The significant association between IQ and performance on the dot prototype task in 
individuals with autism but not in control individuals suggests that higher intelligence scores 
may have allowed some individuals with autism to use alternative strategies to perform well 
without needing to form a prototype.  However, these alternative strategies were likely not as 
effective or efficient as abstracting a prototype to aid in the decision process.  A close 
examination of the dot prototype data indicates that even though the individuals with autism who 
appeared to successfully form a prototype of dot pattern information did not significantly differ 
from the Control group in their Percent Endorsed or D’ scores, their scores were somewhat lower 
than the scores of the Control group.  Therefore, while a subgroup of individuals with autism was 
able to perform well on the prototype tasks; their strategies may not have been as effective or 
efficient.   
When individuals with autism are presented with even more subtle quantitative spatial 
variation and complex information, these potential alternative strategies or compensatory 
mechanisms may be even less effective or efficient or may completely break down.  In the 
current study, more individuals with autism showed successful performance on the dot prototype 
task than the face prototype task.  One possible explanation for the differences in performance 
between the two tasks is that the individuals with autism had more difficulty with the face 
prototype task due to the social nature of the face stimuli.  An equally possible explanation for 
this difference is that the more subtle and complex quantitative spatial variation that is present in 
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faces did not allow for successful performance using the potential alternative strategies suggested 
above.  Unfortunately, there were also a number of methodological differences between the face 
and dot prototype tasks that make the direct comparisons between the two tasks quite difficult.  
Future research should improve the ability to make direct comparisons between social and non-
social prototype formation or categorization abilities by using tasks that are more 
methodologically equivalent in addition to using stimuli that have more similar levels of subtle 
quantitative spatial variation of features (e.g., faces and Greebles). 
4.4 LIMITATIONS 
Even though the current study expands and improves upon previous studies on prototype 
formation and categorization, there are some limitations that must be discussed.  First, even 
though the sample size was adequate for group level analyses, it was too small to allow for 
formal statistical tests to be performed at the subgroup level.  It was also too small to allow for 
analyses to be conducted across experiments.  A second limitation is that participants in the 
Autism group were all high-functioning.  Thus, the results may not generalize to the full 
spectrum of autism disorders.  Another limitation that occurs in studies of cognitive abilities in 
high-functioning individuals with autism is that it is difficult to determine whether successful 
performance on the tasks reflects intact abilities or whether the individuals with autism are using 
alternative strategies or compensatory mechanisms to perform the tasks.  A final limitation of the 
study is the methodological differences between the face prototype and dot prototype tasks that 
made between task comparisons difficult.  Suggestions for future research to address these 
limitations are made in the following section of this paper.   
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4.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Despite the limitations presented above, the current study was the first to examine 
prototype formation abilities in individuals with autism in both social and non-social domains.  It 
was also the first study to address both if individuals with autism have a deficit in prototype 
formation in addition to why they may have this deficit.  These results should be replicated in 
other large samples of individuals with autism with a wide variety of ability levels using both 
social and non-social stimuli.  Due to the amount of variability in performance in individuals 
with autism, future studies of prototype formation should recruit large enough groups to allow 
for more thorough statistical analyses of subgroup level differences and cross-task comparisons.  
Future studies should also examine prototype formation in low-functioning individuals with 
autism to determine whether deficits in prototype formation extend to these individuals.   
It was previously suggested that future research on prototype formation should improve 
the ability to make direct comparisons between social and non-social prototype formation or 
categorization abilities by using tasks that are more methodologically equivalent in addition to 
using stimuli that have more similar levels of subtle quantitative spatial variation of features 
(e.g., faces and Greebles).  One way in which to make the tasks more equivalent would be to 
make the dot pattern stimuli larger.  In the current study, participants did not have to look at 
more than one area of the stimulus in order to “see” the entire stimulus in their central vision.  
This was supported by the eye-tracking data that showed that all participants looked at few dots 
in each pattern during the familiarization phase.  Therefore it was difficult to determine whether 
there were any differences in the way in which the individuals with autism looked at or 
processed the dot patterns.  Another way to make the tasks more equivalent would be to use 
similar procedures for the face prototype and dot prototype tasks.  For example, the dot prototype 
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task could use the same procedure as the face prototype task in the current study.  Participants 
could be familiarized with high distortions of the prototype dot pattern and then shown two dot 
patterns (a new high distortion and the prototype).  They could then be asked which dot pattern is 
more familiar to test for prototype abstraction.   
The relationships that were found between prototype formation and measures of 
intelligence, symptoms of autism, and low-level perceptual processing provide additional 
avenues for future research.  Future studies should further examine the relationship between 
prototype formation and perceptual processing using tasks that measure weak central coherence 
or enhanced local processing such as the Navon task.  It is important for future research to 
continue to distinguish whether the difficulties in prototype formation are due to a general 
cognitive deficit in prototype formation or whether they are due to difficulties in the perception 
of social and non-social information.  Future studies should also further examine the relationship 
between prototype formation and symptoms of autism.  In particular, future research should 
investigate whether the deficits that were found with perceptual categories in the current study 
extend to the formation of abstract and social concepts and understanding and production of 
language that may be reflected in the ADOS social and communication scores. 
Even though the current study found deficits in prototype formation for social and non-
social perceptual information in adults with autism, researchers have not studied the 
developmental trajectory of prototype formation in individuals with autism.  It is possible that 
children with autism may have more difficulty forming a prototype than adults due to adults’ 
increased experience with learning alternative strategies.  Therefore, future studies should 
examine prototype formation across the lifespan to determine whether the difficulties that were 
found in the current study are also present in children with autism and to what extent.  On a 
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related note, if the deficits in the current study truly reflect deficits in prototype formation, 
individuals with autism may have deficits in prototype formation as early as infancy.   As was 
suggested earlier, an early deficit in categorization or prototype formation may lead to 
difficulties in socialization and communication.  Therefore, future research on infant siblings of 
children with autism should study prototype formation and categorization in these younger 
populations and determine whether infant siblings of children with autism who evidence 
difficulties with prototype formation or categorization are likely to have more social and 
communication deficits at a later age.   
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the current study was the first to examine prototype formation in social 
and non-social domains in individuals with autism.  While there have been a limited number of 
studies on prototype formation in individuals with autism, the results of the current study are 
consistent with previous studies that have found a deficit in prototype formation.  The results 
also fit the pattern of findings in the categorization literature that suggest that individuals with 
autism are able to successfully categorize when the task involves simple and typical basic level 
objects or when categorization can be based on definitive boundaries, features, or rules.  
However, they experience difficulty when categorization is more complex, involves less typical 
objects or fuzzy boundaries, or when it requires the perception of subtle spatial variations or 
comparisons to a central representation such as a prototype.  The latter, more complex type of 
categorization is required for the successful categorization of real world natural categories.   
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 While the current study revealed difficulties with prototype formation and categorization 
of two perceptual categories (faces and dot patterns), it is possible that the results are reflective 
of a more general difficulty with reducing information and memory load by making a summative 
or central representation of this information.  Due to the critical role that prototype formation 
plays in categorization and that categorization plays in understanding the world around us from 
the day that we are born, a deficit in these abilities could have a major impact for real world 
functioning.  In fact, it is possible that these difficulties may extend to the understanding of 
abstract social concepts such as friendship or emotions.  Since social concepts are abstract, 
complex, and involve even more subtle variation than other natural categories, individuals with 
autism may have even more difficulty when required to process and categorize this type of 
information.  An early deficit in the mechanisms used to form prototypes could result in infants 
having difficulty decreasing the amount of information in a complex environment and may result 
in them becoming overstimulated by this information, possibly even leading to avoidance of 
complex social information.  While the current study is an important first step, many more 
studies need to be conducted in order to determine the exact role that prototype formation and 
categorization deficits play in the syndrome of autism.  As such, the current study highlights the 
need to consider the role that cognitive processes such as prototype formation and categorization 
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